PMCs and anti-piracy, where is the fit? Part I
By Jake Allen
In the coming weeks I plan to take a look at 3 of the ways that private security firms can find a productive role to play in the counter-piracy effort off the coast of Somalia. The three areas I will be taking a closer look at are:
- Security Guards Aboard/Armed with Lethal Weapons
- Security Guards Aboard/Unarmed or using Less-than-lethal weapons
- Security Guards Adjacent/ Escort Vessels
Security Guards Aboard/Armed with Lethal Weapons
Benefits: The primary benefit of having armed guards on board is that their visual presence alone can serve as a deterrent to an attack. Armed vessels represent what is called a ‘hard target’. In other words, given the choice of attacking a unarmed vessel or an armed vessel the unarmed vessel represents a ‘softer target’ comparatively speaking. Though is not possible to calculate how many attacks were avoided due to a more defensive posture the hard/soft target is widely accepted in most all other criminal circumstances and there is no reason to believe it would not also apply on the high seas. However, many experts counter this argument by stating that the number of attacks do not actually drop they are simply diverted to other ships which appear as easier targets. Yet even if this is so it adds a level of complexity to the pirates planning and execution that he has thus far not needed to account for and over time this can have an effect.
In the event of an attack the armed guards’ presence at the point-of-attack offers considerable tactical advantage and is by far the most likely method for successfully deterring an attack. Especially when compared to an unarmed guard approach or a escort vessel method of security. The physical ’high ground’ afforded by ship’s decks as well as the limited cover and concealment offers significant advantages tactically during a fire fight should one occur.
4 to 6 qualified marksmen armed with weapons that are effective at point-targets out to a distance of 800 meters would be all that is required to successfully repel a coordinated pirate attack. This use of force must be only applied within the framework of Rules of Engagement which are well defined and commonly interpreted.
Challenges/Limitations: The difficulty in executing the ’armed guard’ scenario are a mix of logistics and legal. The area where armed guards may be necessary in relation to the overall distance travelled on most journeys is relatively short. The typical westbound journey which originates Asia bound for a European port could take between 3 and 4 weeks. During that time armed guards may only be necessary for less than 5 days. In the case of the Horn of Africa region the shipping carrier has no need for armed guards prior to reaching the western Indian Ocean and would no longer need the guards once it entered the Red Sea and would most certainly no longer need them as it approached Suez. This leaves the carrier rightfully unwilling to pay for the guards when they are not necessary.
From the security company’s perspective getting their guards onboard when needed and off when not presents a real logistical challenge requiring a footprint somewhere along the northern shore between Oman and Saudi Arabia or on the southern shore between Somalia and the Sudan. A simple map reconnaissance and knowledge of the region can quickly rule out several otherwise ideal geographical locations as being too politically unstable to operate from. The introduction of weapons to the equation adds a level of complexity relative to compliance with laws, regulations, permits, etc, goes up. Notably the pirates are not encumbered by these regulations.
Legally speaking carrying arms aboard a commercial ship can be problematic, especially if the ship wishes to or needs to enter a port with arms onboard. While there is more latitude afforded while steaming in international waters in the case of the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea the proximity to the national waters of Yemen, Somalia, Djibouti, Oman, Eritrea, Sudan and Saudi Arabia add a layer of legal complexity that is difficult for law abiding security companies to overcome.
Perhaps the largest legal challenge to this potential solution are the Rules of Engagement necessary to successfully and defend the ship while protecting unnecessary loss of life. As always it is a challenge to develop and define ROEs that can be commonly interpreted and applied. At the end of the day the final decision to use force is a personal one made a the time by the man on the ground. Some cases are kill or be killed while others leave more room for interpretation and debate. All the more reason why the industry needs a form of certification where by both the company as well as the individual security guards can be vetted, trained and supervised in a way that protects all stakeholders’ perspectives. What the industry cannot afford is a migration of many of the unregulated firms operating in other theatres to quickly find themselves involved in the anti-piracy campaign using the same contractors directly out of Iraq or Afghanistan without undergoing the appropriate training and rehearsals.
Liabilities: The liabilities here are potentially many but they mostly all centre around the assumption that the introduction of armed guard will automatically result an increase in casualties and damage to property. As such the resistance to the armed guards concept is mostly championed by the insurance companies and to a lesser degree the ship owners and financiers. Insurance actuaries crave stability and predictability in order to construct the price of the premiums in relation to the potential payouts. In 2008 ransoms were paid out for 40 ships at an estimated $80 million dollars. While this may seem like a large number, in relation to the premium revenues taken in by the underwriters it remains an operating cost they are comfortable with. In light of the fact that even a single vessel sunk by pirates would trigger the insurance company to incur costs of hundreds of millions of dollars.
Summary: Both the root cause of the piracy problem as well as any eventual solution have their roots in economics. The pirates are active because of the financial benefits relative to the downside for failure. The insurance companies view a few million dollars in ransom payments worth the expense when compared to the catastrophic loss of a ship. The carriers, for their part, remain open to the idea of armed guards but have seen their profits thinned recently due to the slackening demand in the shipping market so they often hesitate to further erode profits by paying private security guards out of what would otherwise be operating profit. Finally the logistical challenges and the web of legal risks involved in conducting security operations in the region mean that the rates for security services are often more than many carriers are able or willing to pay.
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Jake Allen is a security consultant and an expert on corporate security and risk management. He is a regular contributor to the Private Military Herald.
