Al Mahdi Ssenkabirwa

At least 200 security guards protecting various American facilities in and around Kampala have petitioned the embassy protesting what they describe as unfair treatment by their bosses.

The guards were contracted by the American Embassy through a local private security, Armor Group. However, Armor Group recently sold its interests to Group 4 Securicor which currently provides security at US offices and residences in the country -a development vehemently opposed by the guards .Group 4 Securicor runs the contract through the US Defence Systems -Uganda arrangement.

According to the guards, the May 22, 2008 takeover by Group 4 Securicor flouted various clauses that govern their contract under the Federal Acquisition Regulations. “The presumed acceptance of the terms and conditions of services of G4S by the members of the Local Guard Force and the subsequent transfer of our earned fringe benefits amounted to abduction, forced labour and human trafficking which are all forbidden not only by the laws of Uganda but also by other international conventions that govern and protect the rights and dignity of the human person,” reads part of the petition addressed to the Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy.

In their petition dated August 6, the guards also accuse their employer of failure to compensate colleagues who sustain injuries while on duty. “Under the Defence Base Act it is a requirement by the employer to provide adequate compensation to the employees but no member of LGF has been compensated for injuries while on duty,” the statement reads.

The American Embassy Assistant Regional Security Officer Mr Daniel Glick declined to comment on the petition but another official at the embassy who requested to remain anonymous because he is not authorised to speak to the media said they had rejected the petition on grounds that the petitioners never followed the proper procedures.

“Under normal circumstances it is the contracted firm (G4S) to petition the embassy so that we can take action but not the employees as it is in their case,” said an official at the Embassy.

The guards also accuse their employers of frustrating their efforts to join a trade union as a way of boosting their bargaining power. “This has led to the Court Martial and subsequent dismissal of the chairman/spokesperson of the guard’s committee (Mr Opige Elyau) who championed the same course,” the petition said.

In a separate interview, Mr Elyau said he was dismissed on allegations that he was inciting the guard force against management. He promised to challenge his dismissal.

The murder trial for two Norwegian security guards begins Friday in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Tjostolv Moland, age 28 and Joshua French, 27 are charged with the shooting death of their hired driver Adebi Kasongo which occurred on the 5^th of May.   Additional charges against the two include espionage and various weapons violations.

Authorities believe the two men shot and killed their driver on an isolated section of road between Kisangani and the Ugandan border but thus far the prosecution has not disclosed their theory as to the motive for the crime.  For their part the Norwegians insist they are innocent of any wrongdoing but thus far have not indicated who they believe fired the fatal shots.

Tjostolv Moland and Joshua French are charged with the shooting death of their hired driver. Photo courtesy of Thomas Hubert/Aftenposten.

Evidence seized recently at the apartment the two men shared in Uganda could play a large role n the eventual outcome of the trial.  During the police raid authorities found Norwegian military ID cards, counterfeit United Nations hats, employee ID badges with both the correct and false names of the two men.  The employee badges are from a heretofore little known security company named Special Interventions Group (SIG) which is owned by and mostly staffed by Norwegians.  During the raid on the apartment authorities also confiscated at least one rifle and a camera containing pictures of the two men on their recent travels in Africa.  In one grainy image, believed to have been taken by Mr. French, Mr. Moland is seen smiling as he washes the blood believed to be that of Mr. Kasongo from the inside of the hired car.

Vague Details

Only recently have Moland and French begun discussing their case publicly.  Previously French was inexplicably coy about his true identity and had been operating under the name “John Hunt”.  Their use of false names likely lead the prosecution to become extra suspicious especially in light of the fact that the two resided in Uganda, with whom the Congo has a long, contentious and bloody past.

As portions of their story emerged it became evident that key details remained undisclosed.  Not least of which were what exactly were the two men doing in the restive eastern region of the Congo?

Playing Soldier

Moland and French served briefly in the Norwegian Army’s Telemark Battalion, which in the Norwegian order of battle, is purportedly an elite infantry unit.  It is unknown if either deployed operationally during their military service.

The two men had been apparently on somewhat of an African adventure in the months leading up to their arrest.  Photos found both on their own camera as well as those sent home to family and friends show the two men posing for tourist-like snap shots at various locations in central Africa.

Moland has previously stated during interviews with Norwegian reporters that the company he founded and insists is legitimate, Special Interventions Group – Uganda and he contends that it “has nothing to do with” other companies with the name Special Interventions Group.  This appears to conflict with the  recently obtained  SIG-Uganda employee ID badges which bear the identical SIG logo and the name false name of Mike Callan and John Hunt each accompanying Moland and French’s respective photographs.  Furthermore,  the name ‘Mike Callan’, apparently used by Moland,  is listed as recently as 2008 on SIG brochures as the Chief Executive Officer of SIG-Uganda.

Representatives from SIG have thus far not commented publicly on the pending trial of Moland and French.  However, in previous public interviews members of their staff, including one identifying himself as “John Hunt” had claimed that SIG has executed offensive combat operations in Africa, including in the DRC.

Details regarding the specific business activities undertaken by SIG-Uganda are difficult to ascertain but it is not believed that the venture had proven particularly lucrative for Moland, who asserted himself in recent interviews as the primary owner.  In addition to offering security services both Moland and French we also said to be “attempting to organize corporate adventure tours” in partnership with a large international travel company but thus far Moland or French have refused to disclose the name of the company.

Low Tech, High Stakes

The physical conditions that the accused find them selves in now are deplorable, despite the fact that they apparently occupy the best cell in the filthy and antiquated Kisangani jail.  Their ragged physical appearance and Spartan treatment thus far gives a clear indication of the sophistication of the trial that likely awaits them.  Interestingly, both men have been confined together which in almost all circumstances would not have been the norm.  Their time together will have certainly given them time to corroborate details of their defense and this could make it difficult for the prosecution if they are unable to present a compelling enough case.

It is not expected that much if any forensic or physical evidence of value will be presented at the trial.  Instead the prosecution seems to place the majority of its case in witness testimony and circumstantial evidence.

So, as early as Friday perhaps additional details will emerge regarding the events that lead to the death of Adebi Kasongo.  If convicted on the murder charge the two men could receive a life sentence to be served in a Congo prison.

WASHINGTON – The global shipping industry should consider placing armed guards on its boats to ward off pirates who have become increasingly violent, the U.S. military commander who oversees the African coastline said Friday.

Gen. David Petraeus told a House committee that just trying to outrun or block pirates from boarding cargo ships isn’t enough to deter sea bandits off Somalia who are becoming more aggressive.

The shipping industry has resisted arming their boats, which would deny them port in some nations.

Petraeus said defensive preparations short of armed guards “can work. You can have water hoses and others that can make it more difficult,” he said. But he added, “It’s tough to be on the end of a water hose if the other guy is on the end of an RPG [a rocket-propelled grenade launcher]. So you’ve got to think your way through that calculation as well.”

By Jake Allen

In the coming weeks I plan to take a look at 3 of the ways that private security firms can find a productive role to play in the counter-piracy effort off the coast of Somalia. The three areas I will be taking a closer look at are:

1. Security Guards Aboard/Armed with Lethal Weapons
2. Security Guards Aboard/Unarmed or using Less-than-lethal weapons
3. Security Guards Adjacent/ Escort Vessels

Security Guards Aboard/Armed with Lethal Weapons

Benefits: The primary benefit of having armed guards on board is that their visual presence alone can serve as a deterrent to an attack.  Armed vessels represent what is called a ‘hard target’.  In other words, given the choice of attacking a unarmed vessel or an armed vessel the unarmed vessel represents a ‘softer target’ comparatively speaking.  Though is not possible to calculate how many attacks were avoided due to a more defensive posture the hard/soft target is widely accepted in most all other criminal circumstances and there is no reason to believe it would not also apply on the high seas.   However, many experts counter this argument by stating that the number of attacks do not actually drop they are simply diverted to other ships which appear as easier targets.   Yet even if this is so it adds a level of complexity to the pirates planning and execution that he has thus far not needed to account for and over time this can have an effect.

In the event of an attack the armed guards’ presence at the point-of-attack offers considerable tactical advantage and is by far the most likely method for successfully deterring an attack. Especially when compared to an unarmed guard approach or a escort vessel method of security. The physical ’high ground’ afforded by ship’s decks as well as the limited cover and concealment offers significant advantages tactically during a fire fight should one occur.

4 to 6 qualified marksmen armed with weapons that are effective at point-targets out to a distance of 800 meters would be all that is required to successfully repel a coordinated pirate attack. This use of force must be only applied within the framework of Rules of Engagement which are well defined and commonly interpreted.

Challenges/Limitations: The difficulty in executing the ’armed guard’ scenario are a mix of logistics and legal. The area where armed guards may be necessary in relation to the overall distance travelled on most journeys is relatively short. The typical westbound journey which originates Asia bound for a European port could take between 3 and 4 weeks. During that time armed guards may only be necessary for less than 5 days. In the case of the Horn of Africa region the shipping carrier has no need for armed guards prior to reaching the western Indian Ocean and would no longer need the guards once it entered the Red Sea and would most certainly no longer need them as it approached Suez. This leaves the carrier rightfully unwilling to pay for the guards when they are not necessary.

From the security company’s perspective getting their guards onboard when needed and off when not presents a real logistical challenge requiring a footprint somewhere along the northern shore between Oman and Saudi Arabia or on the southern shore between Somalia and the Sudan. A simple map reconnaissance and knowledge of the region can quickly rule out several otherwise ideal geographical locations as being too politically unstable to operate from. The introduction of weapons to the equation adds a level of complexity relative to compliance with laws, regulations, permits, etc, goes up. Notably the pirates are not encumbered by these regulations.

Legally speaking carrying arms aboard a commercial ship can be problematic, especially if the ship wishes to or needs to enter a port with arms onboard. While there is more latitude afforded while steaming in international waters in the case of the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea the proximity to the national waters of Yemen, Somalia, Djibouti, Oman, Eritrea, Sudan and Saudi Arabia add a layer of legal complexity that is difficult for law abiding security companies to overcome.

Perhaps the largest legal challenge to this potential solution are the Rules of Engagement necessary to successfully and defend the ship while protecting unnecessary loss of life. As always it is a challenge to develop and define ROEs that can be commonly interpreted and applied. At the end of the day the final decision to use force is a personal one made a the time by the man on the ground. Some cases are kill or be killed while others leave more room for interpretation and debate. All the more reason why the industry needs a form of certification where by both the company as well as the individual security guards can be vetted, trained and supervised in a way that protects all stakeholders’ perspectives. What the industry cannot afford is a migration of many of the unregulated firms operating in other theatres to quickly find themselves involved in the anti-piracy campaign using the same contractors directly out of Iraq or Afghanistan without undergoing the appropriate training and rehearsals.

Liabilities: The liabilities here are potentially many but they mostly all centre around the assumption that the introduction of armed guard will automatically result an increase in casualties and damage to property. As such the resistance to the armed guards concept is mostly championed by the insurance companies and to a lesser degree the ship owners and financiers. Insurance actuaries crave stability and predictability in order to construct the price of the premiums in relation to the potential payouts. In 2008 ransoms were paid out for 40 ships at an estimated $80 million dollars. While this may seem like a large number, in relation to the premium revenues taken in by the underwriters it remains an operating cost they are comfortable with. In light of the fact that even a single vessel sunk by pirates would trigger the insurance company to incur costs of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Summary: Both the root cause of the piracy problem as well as any eventual solution have their roots in economics. The pirates are active because of the financial benefits relative to the downside for failure. The insurance companies view a few million dollars in ransom payments worth the expense when compared to the catastrophic loss of a ship. The carriers, for their part, remain open to the idea of armed guards but have seen their profits thinned recently due to the slackening demand in the shipping market so they often hesitate to further erode profits by paying private security guards out of what would otherwise be operating profit. Finally the logistical challenges and the web of legal risks involved in conducting security operations in the region mean that the rates for security services are often more than many carriers are able or willing to pay.

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Jake Allen is a security consultant and an expert on corporate security and risk management. He is a regular contributor to the Private Military Herald.