The murder trial for two Norwegian security guards begins Friday in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Tjostolv Moland, age 28 and Joshua French, 27 are charged with the shooting death of their hired driver Adebi Kasongo which occurred on the 5^th of May.   Additional charges against the two include espionage and various weapons violations.

Authorities believe the two men shot and killed their driver on an isolated section of road between Kisangani and the Ugandan border but thus far the prosecution has not disclosed their theory as to the motive for the crime.  For their part the Norwegians insist they are innocent of any wrongdoing but thus far have not indicated who they believe fired the fatal shots.

Tjostolv Moland and Joshua French are charged with the shooting death of their hired driver. Photo courtesy of Thomas Hubert/Aftenposten.

Evidence seized recently at the apartment the two men shared in Uganda could play a large role n the eventual outcome of the trial.  During the police raid authorities found Norwegian military ID cards, counterfeit United Nations hats, employee ID badges with both the correct and false names of the two men.  The employee badges are from a heretofore little known security company named Special Interventions Group (SIG) which is owned by and mostly staffed by Norwegians.  During the raid on the apartment authorities also confiscated at least one rifle and a camera containing pictures of the two men on their recent travels in Africa.  In one grainy image, believed to have been taken by Mr. French, Mr. Moland is seen smiling as he washes the blood believed to be that of Mr. Kasongo from the inside of the hired car.

Vague Details

Only recently have Moland and French begun discussing their case publicly.  Previously French was inexplicably coy about his true identity and had been operating under the name “John Hunt”.  Their use of false names likely lead the prosecution to become extra suspicious especially in light of the fact that the two resided in Uganda, with whom the Congo has a long, contentious and bloody past.

As portions of their story emerged it became evident that key details remained undisclosed.  Not least of which were what exactly were the two men doing in the restive eastern region of the Congo?

Playing Soldier

Moland and French served briefly in the Norwegian Army’s Telemark Battalion, which in the Norwegian order of battle, is purportedly an elite infantry unit.  It is unknown if either deployed operationally during their military service.

The two men had been apparently on somewhat of an African adventure in the months leading up to their arrest.  Photos found both on their own camera as well as those sent home to family and friends show the two men posing for tourist-like snap shots at various locations in central Africa.

Moland has previously stated during interviews with Norwegian reporters that the company he founded and insists is legitimate, Special Interventions Group – Uganda and he contends that it “has nothing to do with” other companies with the name Special Interventions Group.  This appears to conflict with the  recently obtained  SIG-Uganda employee ID badges which bear the identical SIG logo and the name false name of Mike Callan and John Hunt each accompanying Moland and French’s respective photographs.  Furthermore,  the name ‘Mike Callan’, apparently used by Moland,  is listed as recently as 2008 on SIG brochures as the Chief Executive Officer of SIG-Uganda.

Representatives from SIG have thus far not commented publicly on the pending trial of Moland and French.  However, in previous public interviews members of their staff, including one identifying himself as “John Hunt” had claimed that SIG has executed offensive combat operations in Africa, including in the DRC.

Details regarding the specific business activities undertaken by SIG-Uganda are difficult to ascertain but it is not believed that the venture had proven particularly lucrative for Moland, who asserted himself in recent interviews as the primary owner.  In addition to offering security services both Moland and French we also said to be “attempting to organize corporate adventure tours” in partnership with a large international travel company but thus far Moland or French have refused to disclose the name of the company.

Low Tech, High Stakes

The physical conditions that the accused find them selves in now are deplorable, despite the fact that they apparently occupy the best cell in the filthy and antiquated Kisangani jail.  Their ragged physical appearance and Spartan treatment thus far gives a clear indication of the sophistication of the trial that likely awaits them.  Interestingly, both men have been confined together which in almost all circumstances would not have been the norm.  Their time together will have certainly given them time to corroborate details of their defense and this could make it difficult for the prosecution if they are unable to present a compelling enough case.

It is not expected that much if any forensic or physical evidence of value will be presented at the trial.  Instead the prosecution seems to place the majority of its case in witness testimony and circumstantial evidence.

So, as early as Friday perhaps additional details will emerge regarding the events that lead to the death of Adebi Kasongo.  If convicted on the murder charge the two men could receive a life sentence to be served in a Congo prison.

By Jake Allen

In the coming weeks I plan to take a look at 3 of the ways that private security firms can find a productive role to play in the counter-piracy effort off the coast of Somalia. The three areas I will be taking a closer look at are:

1. Security Guards Aboard/Armed with Lethal Weapons
2. Security Guards Aboard/Unarmed or using Less-than-lethal weapons
3. Security Guards Adjacent/ Escort Vessels

Security Guards Aboard/Armed with Lethal Weapons

Benefits: The primary benefit of having armed guards on board is that their visual presence alone can serve as a deterrent to an attack.  Armed vessels represent what is called a ‘hard target’.  In other words, given the choice of attacking a unarmed vessel or an armed vessel the unarmed vessel represents a ‘softer target’ comparatively speaking.  Though is not possible to calculate how many attacks were avoided due to a more defensive posture the hard/soft target is widely accepted in most all other criminal circumstances and there is no reason to believe it would not also apply on the high seas.   However, many experts counter this argument by stating that the number of attacks do not actually drop they are simply diverted to other ships which appear as easier targets.   Yet even if this is so it adds a level of complexity to the pirates planning and execution that he has thus far not needed to account for and over time this can have an effect.

In the event of an attack the armed guards’ presence at the point-of-attack offers considerable tactical advantage and is by far the most likely method for successfully deterring an attack. Especially when compared to an unarmed guard approach or a escort vessel method of security. The physical ’high ground’ afforded by ship’s decks as well as the limited cover and concealment offers significant advantages tactically during a fire fight should one occur.

4 to 6 qualified marksmen armed with weapons that are effective at point-targets out to a distance of 800 meters would be all that is required to successfully repel a coordinated pirate attack. This use of force must be only applied within the framework of Rules of Engagement which are well defined and commonly interpreted.

Challenges/Limitations: The difficulty in executing the ’armed guard’ scenario are a mix of logistics and legal. The area where armed guards may be necessary in relation to the overall distance travelled on most journeys is relatively short. The typical westbound journey which originates Asia bound for a European port could take between 3 and 4 weeks. During that time armed guards may only be necessary for less than 5 days. In the case of the Horn of Africa region the shipping carrier has no need for armed guards prior to reaching the western Indian Ocean and would no longer need the guards once it entered the Red Sea and would most certainly no longer need them as it approached Suez. This leaves the carrier rightfully unwilling to pay for the guards when they are not necessary.

From the security company’s perspective getting their guards onboard when needed and off when not presents a real logistical challenge requiring a footprint somewhere along the northern shore between Oman and Saudi Arabia or on the southern shore between Somalia and the Sudan. A simple map reconnaissance and knowledge of the region can quickly rule out several otherwise ideal geographical locations as being too politically unstable to operate from. The introduction of weapons to the equation adds a level of complexity relative to compliance with laws, regulations, permits, etc, goes up. Notably the pirates are not encumbered by these regulations.

Legally speaking carrying arms aboard a commercial ship can be problematic, especially if the ship wishes to or needs to enter a port with arms onboard. While there is more latitude afforded while steaming in international waters in the case of the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea the proximity to the national waters of Yemen, Somalia, Djibouti, Oman, Eritrea, Sudan and Saudi Arabia add a layer of legal complexity that is difficult for law abiding security companies to overcome.

Perhaps the largest legal challenge to this potential solution are the Rules of Engagement necessary to successfully and defend the ship while protecting unnecessary loss of life. As always it is a challenge to develop and define ROEs that can be commonly interpreted and applied. At the end of the day the final decision to use force is a personal one made a the time by the man on the ground. Some cases are kill or be killed while others leave more room for interpretation and debate. All the more reason why the industry needs a form of certification where by both the company as well as the individual security guards can be vetted, trained and supervised in a way that protects all stakeholders’ perspectives. What the industry cannot afford is a migration of many of the unregulated firms operating in other theatres to quickly find themselves involved in the anti-piracy campaign using the same contractors directly out of Iraq or Afghanistan without undergoing the appropriate training and rehearsals.

Liabilities: The liabilities here are potentially many but they mostly all centre around the assumption that the introduction of armed guard will automatically result an increase in casualties and damage to property. As such the resistance to the armed guards concept is mostly championed by the insurance companies and to a lesser degree the ship owners and financiers. Insurance actuaries crave stability and predictability in order to construct the price of the premiums in relation to the potential payouts. In 2008 ransoms were paid out for 40 ships at an estimated $80 million dollars. While this may seem like a large number, in relation to the premium revenues taken in by the underwriters it remains an operating cost they are comfortable with. In light of the fact that even a single vessel sunk by pirates would trigger the insurance company to incur costs of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Summary: Both the root cause of the piracy problem as well as any eventual solution have their roots in economics. The pirates are active because of the financial benefits relative to the downside for failure. The insurance companies view a few million dollars in ransom payments worth the expense when compared to the catastrophic loss of a ship. The carriers, for their part, remain open to the idea of armed guards but have seen their profits thinned recently due to the slackening demand in the shipping market so they often hesitate to further erode profits by paying private security guards out of what would otherwise be operating profit. Finally the logistical challenges and the web of legal risks involved in conducting security operations in the region mean that the rates for security services are often more than many carriers are able or willing to pay.

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Jake Allen is a security consultant and an expert on corporate security and risk management. He is a regular contributor to the Private Military Herald.

By Jake Allen

Although there were many who agreed with yesterday’s rant about the  piracy problem off the coast of Somalia I did take some heat from a few readers. Perhaps some of that heat was justified and in rereading the post it does read as more angry than I certainly am.

The truth is I have long been level-headed realist when it comes to dealing with this piracy problem. Note I said, ‘dealing’ with the problem and not ‘solving’ the problem. The solution, of course, will come some day when Somalia is able to establish a functional government which can provide services for its people and stand up a working coast guard to both defend its territorial waters as well as enforce laws prohibiting piracy. But as that day is not likely to arrive soon let’s put aside solutions and discuss counter measures which can deal with the realities in the interim.

The death of these teenage pirates is indeed tragic but we must remember that 19 year-old men are responsible for their actions.  They  chose at multiple junctions not to release the hostage.  In fact it has been reported that they were surprised to learn that the ship was crewed by Americans.  The decision not to retreat at that early stage turned out to be a poor one.  But in the subsequent days they were offered many other chances to lay down their arms and release the hostage.  Perhaps, as I will touch on below their death may serve to bring into balance the calculations taken by other pirates as to whether or not piracy is worth the effort.

While we celebrate the hostages successful release let us also not forget that what is required to prevent future events of this type is a total approach to the problem. Killing  pirates or those suspected of piracy on-site is no more a winning strategy by itself  than relying solely on water cannons or other non-lethal approaches.  Furthermore navy patrols alone are not the answer. Nor is arresting and prosecuting every armed “fisherman” found off the Somali coast.  The complexity of the challenge requires us to adopt a coordinated and comprehensive strategy.

Before we look at that strategy let’s  just revisit the business case from the pirates perspective so that we can understand and ultimately change his calculations. There are basically only 4 outcomes which pirates are able to achieve.

1. Success: Ransom paid out
2. Failure: Return to shore empty handed
3. Failure: Arrested and tried in a court-of-law for piracy
4. Failure: Lost or killed at sea

With that said.  Let’s look at what each stakeholder here can do to contribute to an increase in outcomes 2, 3 and 4.

Ransoms: Part of the problem here and the driving force behind the piracy market is the fact that shipping companies willingly and often too quickly payout multimillion dollar ransoms. Certainly if you were a hostage this is precisely what you would want to occur but the problem with this is that it only encourages more attacks as more and more pirates enter the ‘lottery’ in an effort to get some easy money. Were carriers and insurance companies to stop paying ransoms this market would disappear over night. Desperate people might resort to other types of crime but piracy-for-ransom would effectively end. Ransoms may be warranted but they need to be drastically curtailed and reduced in size through tough and often long-drawn out negotiations. Ransoms are money in the hand of pirates, but it needs to be hard- money and not easy-money.

Naval escorts: The navies of the world do need to maintain an active presence in the region but let us be realistic about what effect they can have.  Yesterday’s successful recover of Captain Phillips notwithstanding we can already see a game of whack-a-mole developing where pirates simply have moved out of the Gulf of Aden and are now more active in the western Indian Ocean. The navies are a critical element to the equation but they alone are not capable of dealing with this problem. At best they will serve as a deterrent when they are in a particular geographical area but only a 911 emergency responder to areas where they are not. Already with the rescue of Captain Phillips the U.S. Navy has set a precedent for getting involved post incident. Will that continue? What if the next Captain is not an American? How will these decisions be made? What kind of signal will that send not only to the pirates but to our allies?

Armed guards aboard: As indicated the Obama administration is presently making the new realities clear to the shipping providers. It will be made to them in no uncertain terms that they are going to have to shoulder more ownership for the security of the ship, cargo and crew. It is understandable, based on some of the cowboy firms we have seen performing armed security in Iraq and Afghanistan, that many are hesitant to introduce more guns to this theatre. But there are a number of practical realities of the maritime environment which make it ideally suited to the use of PMCs. For one the list of potential clients is knowable and likely 80% of shipping traffic in this area is conducted by 20% of the companies. Governments could step in here and provide a list of ‘authorized suppliers’ of security services and forbid carriers from using security companies who are not on the approved list. This of course opens the whole discussion around the definition of ‘qualified’ but in all honesty this is a discussion that has been necessary for a long, long time. The bottom line is that a viable deterrent must be co-located at the point of the attack.

Prosecution: The U.S. entered into an agreement with Kenya earlier this year whereby pirates caught in international or Somali waters could be transported to Mombasa for trial. To date this mechanism has not proven effective. Mostly due to evidential complications of documenting and proving acts of piracy. While these challenges will not disappear this legal framework needs more throughput. We cannot stop simply because it’s too hard. We need to understand clearly what evidence will be required at trial for a successful prosecution and ensure that the navies and law enforcement are able to document that evidence and protect the chain-of-custody in such a way that trials are both fair but also effective.

We can control the proportions...

One way to think of this problem is in the shape of a pie where we have control over the proportionality of the 4 pieces or outcomes.   To date the Trial/Prosecution portion is far too small while conversely the Ransom Payout piece is far too large. While Killed/lost at sea may preferably always be low in percentage terms it must be a real enough possibility to factor into the pirates business case.

The bottom line is this is business for pirates and to counter this we need to make the business model less appealing if not very difficult as compared to other choices one makes about how to spend their time.  That can only be done through a coordinated effort of both commercial, private and state security mechanisms each working in concert to mutually support eachother.