Posts Tagged ‘Afghanistan’

Blackwater tied to clandestine CIA raids

Friday, December 11th, 2009

Firm’s personnel were drawn into operations on ad-hoc basis

This article was written by R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick at The Washington Post on 11 Dec 2009.

Highly trained personnel employed with the private security firm formerly known as Blackwater Worldwide sometimes operated side by side with CIA field officers in Iraq and Afghanistan as the agency undertook missions to kill or capture members of insurgent groups in those countries, according to a former government official and a source familiar with the operations.

The actions taken by the private personnel went beyond the protective role specified in a classified Blackwater contract with the CIA and included active participation in raids overseen by CIA or special forces personnel, these sources said. They emphasized that roles and responsibilities often are blurred or altered in a battlefield setting, and that Blackwater personnel were drawn into the operations on an ad-hoc basis because they were present and had the necessary skills.

Still, the involvement of Blackwater’s officers in raids is likely to raise new questions about the degree to which deadly actions in Iraq and Afghanistan were outsourced to contract personnel who operated without direct contractual authority or without the kind of oversight and accountability applied to CIA and military personnel.

CIA Director Leon Panetta earlier this year ordered the agency to terminate many of its contracts with Blackwater, but CIA officials said Thursday that Panetta has ordered a special internal review of the agency’s contracts with the company to ensure that its work is strictly security-related — a review that may wind up shining a new light on intelligence practices during the Bush administration.

The agency still relies on the firm, now named Xe Services, to provide security for agency employees and assets. Panetta told Congress in the summer that he had shut down a CIA assassination program that employed Blackwater personnel in a supporting role. The CIA has publicly stated that the program, which dated from President George W. Bush’s first term in office, was never fully implemented and that no one was killed. A House committee is investigating that program.

The CIA declined to comment yesterday on specific intelligence operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mark Corallo, a spokesman for Xe Services, said Blackwater was never under contract to participate in covert raids with CIA or Special Forces troops “in Iraq, Afghanistan or anywhere else.” Corallo added: “Any allegation to the contrary by any news organization would be false.” The New York Times published on its Web site Thursday evening a story saying Blackwater guards had participated in clandestine CIA raids.

Several former CIA counterterrorism officials who were based in Washington at the time said CIA headquarters was not aware of such actions and did not authorize them. They said they knew of occasions when Blackwater personnel took part in firefights while protecting CIA officers undertaking lethal raids, but the officials characterized these actions as defensive, not offensive.

A former intelligence officer who managed covert teams overseas said contractors would have been authorized to use deadly force if fired upon. “That was clearly understood and part of the rules,” the official said.

The source familiar with the operations said that they had been reviewed and approved in advance by CIA lawyers, and that agency personnel typically played the dominant role in their planning. Some requests from the field for lethal raids were rejected at CIA headquarters because they posed excessive risks to the U.S. teams or to civilians, or because intelligence experts merely wanted to keep watching the prospective targets.

But when the time came to carry out those raids — often against figures who were thought to be al-Qaeda leaders — some CIA field officers assigned responsibilities among the available personnel without regard to which ones were contractors or federal employees, according to the source, who asked not to be identified because he was not authorized to discuss classified operations.

That meant Blackwater personnel helped to kill some of the targets and did not merely defend the CIA officers taking part in the raids, the source said.

A former agency officer experienced in covert operations in the Middle East said it was common knowledge that military contractors would sometimes participate in missions alongside Special Forces and paramilitary teams. He said the arrangements were made locally and were “practical,” because the active-duty forces and contractors typically shared the same training and were used to working together.

For government employees, working with contractors offered ways to circumvent red tape, said the retired officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “There was no bench strength with either the CIA or Special Forces, so sometimes they would turn to contractors, who often had lots of the same skills,” the former operative said.

Robert Baer, a former CIA officer, said such informal arrangements would undoubtedly lead to problems because they short-circuit normal chains of command. “Once you cede your authorities, people are no longer restrained by regulations and federal law,” Baer said. “There have been abuses; there’s no question about it.”

The CIA’s new review of its Blackwater dealings is only the latest in a series of investigations focused on the firm. Five Blackwater guards are on trial in federal court in the District on manslaughter and other charges in connection with the killing of 14 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in September 2007. The guards’ attorneys contend that the government does not have jurisdiction to bring such charges and that the guards’ conduct was justified. The Justice Department said in November that it would drop charges against one of the guards. A sixth guard pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and is expected to cooperate with federal prosecutors.

The company is also named in a separate civil case in federal court in Virginia in which 70 Iraqi civilians are alleging that the company engaged in “lawless behavior” and that it covered up killings and hired mercenaries. Attorneys for the company have denied the allegations and sought to dismiss the lawsuit.

In an interview with the magazine Vanity Fair this month, Blackwater’s founder and principal owner, Erik Prince — whose conservative leanings are widely known — depicted those who revealed the company’s links to the CIA as motivated in part by politics. “People acting for political reasons disclosed not only the existence of a very sensitive program but my name along with it,” he said.

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Sen. Casey pushes crackdown on government contractors

Sunday, October 4th, 2009

By Robin Acton

One month after the latest electrocution in Iraq, U.S. Sen. Bob Casey has proposed an amendment to a defense appropriations bill that would hold government contractors accountable for the safety of overseas military personnel and civilians working abroad.

The legislation would close a loophole that allowed shoddy electrical work and other problems on American military bases to go uncorrected, the Scranton Democrat said. It would require the Department of Defense to review contracts to ensure they include language requiring contractors to immediately correct deficiencies, such as improperly grounded facilities or equipment, that could cause death or serious injury.

Casey’s amendment also seeks to ensure safe and sanitary water systems, and establish and enforce strict standards for preventing and prosecuting instances of sexual assault.

He has been an outspoken critic of the government’s defense contracting procedures since the Jan. 2, 2008, electrocution of Staff Sgt. Ryan Maseth, 24, of Shaler. The Green Beret collapsed and died when a rooftop pump shorted out and sent a lethal electrical current along water running through metal pipes into his shower in the Radwaniyah Palace Complex in Iraq.

Maseth is among 10 service members and civilian contractors in Iraq who died from electrocutions that could have been prevented, according to Casey.

The most recent occurred Sept. 1 when Adam Hermanson, 25, of Muncy collapsed and died in his shower at Camp Olympia inside Baghdad’s Green Zone. The Air Force veteran, who completed four tours of duty in Iraq, was working as a civilian contractor for Triple Canopy Security Service.

“We’ve had lots of investigation and lots of reviews, but, in my judgment, not enough in the way of answers,” Casey said. He said the Defense and State departments are obligated to provide families with answers about how the electrocutions continue to happen.

Maseth’s parents, Cheryl Harris and Douglas Maseth, filed suit in federal court against defense contractor KBR Inc., alleging shoddy electrical work killed their son. KBR denies responsibility for the soldier’s death, which brought national attention to the electrocution issue and prompted government inspections of facilities military personnel use.

Hermanson’s widow, Janine, said she does not know much about her husband’s living quarters or what he was doing in connection with the war effort because he was not permitted to talk about it. The dental assistant, who is staying with her parents in Muncy, said she learned about his death when she got a phone call at work.

“When he didn’t show up for work, they got worried, and a co-worker went to check on him. He was found in his room in the shower,” she said.

She described her husband as a strong, family-oriented man who did everything he could for his family and friends. They met while serving in the Air Force as they were preparing for deployment to Iraq and would have celebrated their fourth wedding anniversary five days after his death, she said.

“I never had to worry about anything when he was around,” she said, her voice cracking with emotion.

Read this article at the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review

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Use Of Private Security Grows In Iraq, Afghanistan

Friday, October 2nd, 2009

By Kevin Whitelaw

Private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan have sparked plenty of headlines over the past few years, particularly after a few well-publicized allegations of abuse and shootings of civilians.

But it has been difficult to assess how much the Pentagon relies on armed civilians because their numbers have been unclear.

Defense Department officials now say that more than 18,000 armed security contractors are working in Iraq or Afghanistan under Pentagon auspices, according to a new report by the Congressional Research Service that was obtained by NPR.

The bulk of the gun-toting contractors — some 13,232 as of June 30 — are in Iraq, where they guard U.S. bases, defend convoys and serve as personal bodyguards for high-level officials. The remaining 5,165 armed civilians perform similar functions in Afghanistan.

These contractors are not supposed to engage in combat operations, but there have been a number of scandals involving private security firms, including allegations that employees of Blackwater shot 17 Iraqi civilians at a Baghdad traffic circle in 2007, and that guards working for ArmorGroup guarding the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan engaged in ugly hazing rituals.

In both of those cases, the contractors were working for the State Department, rather than the Defense Department. But the actions of these private security contractors can reflect badly on the U.S. government.

Fanning Anti-American Sentiment?

“The perception that DOD [the Department of Defense] and other government agencies are deploying [private security contractors] who abuse and mistreat people can fan anti-American sentiment and strengthen insurgents, even when no abuses are taking place,” the Congressional Research Service report concludes.

But in these two conflicts, contractors have quickly become an integral part of the U.S. war effort, according to U.S. military officials.

“Iraq and Afghanistan appear to be the first two instances where the U.S. government has used private contractors extensively for protecting persons or property in combat or stability operations where host country forces are absent or deficient, but it is not the first time private contractors have been used for such purposes,” says the report. “According to government officials, both DOD and the Department of State would be unable to execute their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan without the support of private security contractors.”

Contractors are easier to hire, quicker to deploy and cheaper than U.S. government personnel. And they also free up much-needed soldiers for combat operations.

“Security is not just Blackwater,” says Michael Cohen, a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation who has studied the use of contractors. “Some are security guards protecting bases, which is far less controversial.”

Numbers Rising Sharply

Either way, their numbers appear to be rising sharply. In Iraq, the U.S. military reported that its armed security contractor workforce jumped 19 percent between March and June 2009.

Part of the increase is due to improved data collection, say Pentagon officials, who did not track the full number of contractors before 2007.

“One of the problems with the data is they only started collecting the data about two years ago,” says Moshe Schwartz, the Congressional Research Service analyst who wrote the report. “Because that data is still improving, it is difficult to get a perfectly clear picture as to the ebb and flow of the number of armed contractors in Iraq. It’s also hard to get a clear picture as to the type of work they’re doing.”

But the rise also represents a growing reliance on security contractors in both war zones. In Iraq, U.S. military officials are turning to private firms to fill new gaps that emerge as U.S. forces begin to draw down.

The dynamic is different in Afghanistan, where worsening violence has sparked a higher demand for private security.

Still, the Pentagon numbers represent only a portion of the overall number of armed civilians in either war zone.

The State Department employed an additional 3,100 contractors in Iraq and more than 600 in Afghanistan as of February, according to Congressional Research Service data.

And then there are even more private armed security guards employed by international organizations, foreign governments and private companies in both places. Estimates are rough, although analysts say the total number of armed civilian guards likely tops 30,000 in Iraq and 20,000 in Afghanistan.

“Less than half of the private security contractors in Iraq are working for the U.S. government,” says Schwartz. “The rest of those contractors don’t have to report their movements to the U.S. government, nor does the U.S. government have any ability to rein in their behavior.”

Armed Contractors A Fraction Of Total

Armed security contractors make up only a small portion of the overall Pentagon contractor workforce. The Defense Department employed a total of 193,674 private contractors in both Iraq and Afghanistan as of June (compared to a total U.S. military deployment of 189,678 soldiers), according to a separate Congressional Research Service report.

Security contractors accounted for only 11 percent of private contractors in Iraq, for example, while more than half of the contractors performed support operations on U.S. bases, such as laundry and catering services.

The Pentagon has increased its efforts to monitor its own contractors over the past two years.

The Pentagon’s surveys reveal that the makeup of armed private security contractors varies considerably between the two war zones. In Iraq, less than 5 percent of the armed civilians are Americans, while less than 8 percent are Iraqi. The remaining 88 percent come from other countries, such as Fiji, Nepal, Chile and Nigeria.

In Afghanistan, the overwhelming majority — some 95 percent — are Afghans.

This article was originally published at NPR.

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Commentary on the Commission on Wartime Contracting Hearings (Part 3)

Monday, September 28th, 2009

In the final installment of a 3-part series David Isenberg, columnist, analyst, researcher and author of Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq provides analysis and commentary on the transcripts of testimony from the recent hearings by the Commission on Wartime Contracting which took place on the 14th of September in Washington.

By David Isenberg

Like my previous posts, what I have done below is to copy various excerpts from the hearing. Each excerpt is italicized and indented. Each excerpt is usually followed by my comment in bold. Sometimes I make observations. Sometimes I ask questions. In some cases I feel the excerpt is so fascinating in its own right that it stands on its own and I make no comment.

PANEL III OF A HEARING OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING;

SUBJECT: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND SECURITY CONTRACTOR MISCONDUCT;

CHAIRED BY: CHRISTOPHER SHAYS AND MICHAEL THIBAULT;

WITNESSES: DOUG BROOKS, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATION ASSOCIATION; WILLIAM BALLHAUS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL; SAM BRINKLEY, VICE PRESIDENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE, WACKENHUT SERVICES INC.;

LOCATION: 2247 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TIME: 1:15 P.M. EDT DATE: MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2009

MR. BROOKS:

I’d like to take a moment first to offer condolences to the family of an IPOA member company employee killed in the savage suicide attack on the NATO base at the Kabul airport on the 8th of September — this was mentioned earlier — the attack that took place close to Camp Sullivan, home to the embassy security contractors. Four other contractors were wounded in that attack. This incident serves to remind us of the often unseen and seldom mentioned danger faced by our civilians who are supporting United States policies abroad.

Yes, that is, truly and sincerely, quite tragic. What does it have to do with the issue at hand, the unprofessionalism of ArmorGroup, which joined IPOA in 2003?

Founded in 2001, membership in IPOA is not automatic and requires disclosures and information not typical of trade associations. Companies can be expelled if they violate the association’s code of conduct.

In all the years that IPOA has had a code of conduct how many companies have been expelled, as opposed to resigning?

I often point out that Afghanistan and Iraq are the best-supported, best-supplied military operations in U.S. history.

And if it was all being done in-house by the regular military it would STILL be the best-supported, best-supplied military operation in U.S. history. Could we please get back to the issue at hand.

In the big picture, the model of private-sector support for the all-volunteer professional military works remarkably well, but nobody denies there are problems that we do need to address. Indeed, when operating in weak and failed states, it would be astonishing if there were not any problems.

Actually, there have been problems elsewhere. Iraq, for example, was a dictatorship but it was not a failed state.

Our industry employees are civilians who are owed all the privacy, human rights and due processes given to private citizens anywhere. At the same time, we recognize that operations in high-risk environments require a balance between rights and responsibilities.

This seems debatable. When contractors work for a client like the U.S. government they are often required to accept conditions that private citizens would never tolerate. Let’s give Mr. Brooks the benefit of a doubt and acknowledge that even the courts have yet to figure this out.

IPOA would welcome a practical review or government-wide conference on how procurement and contract management could be modified for the unique realities of contingency contracting.

There have already been numerous conferences on the subject. IPOA has sponsored many of them. Is he saying they were impractical?

It would be ideal to get the contracting officers, the contracting office representatives, industry executives and country managers in an environment conducive to resolving many of these issues, as partners instead of antagonists.

Are all these parties really antagonistic towards each other? My experience is that they all see each other already as partners.

One issue that perhaps relates to today’s topic is that intense competition is beneficial for obtaining a low price (for ?) the government, but focusing only on price when awarding a contract can ultimately degrade the quality of service. The Departments of Defense and State handle these contracts quite differently, and it would be interesting to explore why.

In theory this is true but real life doesn’t always simulate theory. Providing embassy security services is not like selling computers. How many companies are truly capable of guarding embassies? The State Department had only a handful of bids for the Kabul embassy contract. So it doesn’t seem like there could have been that much competition. But it is good to see he agrees that presumed cost-effectiveness is not the most relevant consideration.

IPOA continues to improve our widely recognized self-regulatory efforts, but it is important to remember that we are not the first responder in contractual and legal issues. We can and do supplement but not replace government oversight and accountability with our own codes and procedures in our focus on ethical concerns.

Widely recognized by whom, IPOA member companies? Is IPOA claiming that when things go well it is, at least in part due to its code of conduct, but when things go wrong it is really the government’s fault? Of course, in this case the U.S. government IS largely at fault.

MR. BRINKLEY:

Certain of our personnel behaved very badly. I am personally embarrassed by their misbehavior and I’m embarrassed to be here speaking about their poor judgment and inappropriate actions, which bring discredit to the Department of State, WSI, AGNA, and the hundreds of other professionals protecting the U.S. embassy in Kabul. There are no excuses. We do not tolerate, will never tolerate, such misbehaviors.

And yet, as both the Gordon law suit and previous CWC panel testimony established, AG did exactly that.

We are putting new management team in place. Phil Rudder (sp), my number two, is already in-country and taking charge of operations in Kabul. He has full executive authority to manage the contracts. He will also assist me in further examining the situation in Kabul and determining whether additional personnel actions are appropriate.

Mr. Rudder (sp) will meet with personnel individually and in groups to ensure they have the appropriate commitment to the highest standards of conduct. Soon Mr. Rudder (sp) will be joined in-country by Mr. Cornelius Medley, a manager with AGNA, who has extensive experience in managing embassy security contracts.

Medley was named as a defendant in Gordon’s law suit. To cite a few examples the complaint charged:

Mr. Gordon’s inquiries revealed that Mr. Du Plessis had authorized Logistics

Manager Sean Garcia to place the order for counterfeit cold weather clothing and boots through Garcia’s wife’s company, Trends General Trading and Marketing, LLC, which was based in Beirut and thereby banned as a contractor. Mr. Gordon consulted with North Face and Altama Boots, the companies whose goods had supposedly been purchased, and both companies confirmed that the items were counterfeit. Mr. Gordon ordered that a formal investigation be conducted by Defendant Cornelius Medley, then the Guard Force Commander and fill-in Deputy Program Manager in Kabul. He further instructed Mr. Medley to assume all of Mr. Garcia’s duties immediately. Unbeknownst to Mr. Gordon, Defendant Medley was a crony of Messrs. Du Plessis and Garcia and actively stonewalled his efforts to investigate this matter.

In addition to stripping Mr. Gordon of his duties, AGNA set out to make Mr.

Gordon’s working conditions intolerable. Mr. Medley excluded Mr. Gordon from management meetings, intimidated the rest of the staff by asking them if they supported Mr. Gordon or himself, shunned him, and relegated him to a persona non grata in the office. Mr. Gordon complained to Mr. Hoffman about Mr. Medley’s actions. Initially, Mr. Hoffman assured him falsely that these issues would be dealt with. However, no corrective action was taken, despite Mr. Hoffman’s knowledge that Mr. Medley’s actions had created a humiliating and hostile work environment for Mr. Gordon. In fact, Mr. Hoffman relegated Mr. Gordon to his office with minimal contacts with any other senior management and regularly excluded him from his meetings, all in an effort to force Mr. Gordon’s resignation. Mr. Medley made clear to Mr. Gordon by his behavior and to other staff members by his direct boasts that his priority was to force Mr. Gordon to quit.

In or around early March 2008, for example, Defendants Hoffman and Medley instructed Ms. Power to lie to DoS regarding Mr. Garcia’s continued employment with AGNA. They instructed her to tell DoS that AGNA had terminated Mr. Garcia from the contract when, in fact, he was still working under the Kabul contract and assisting AGNA in conducting inventories of its ammunition for its reports to DoS.

In fact, after Defendant Medley assumed responsibility for the Kabul Embassy contract, the ammunition inventory count revealed a shortfall of tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition. Mr. Medley directed AGNA employee Misty Maldonado, who was responsible for preparing the inventory report for DoS, to alter the report to remove any reference to the missing ammunition or the disappearance of the inventory. Only when Deputy Director of Operations Gregory Vrentas challenged Mr. Medley’s direction to provide false reports to DoS did Mr. Medley back down.

Defendant Medley knew that AGNA guards continued to frequent brothels and took no action to stop this unlawful practice. In a conversation with AGNA Training Manager Hal Simpson in mid-2008 about the fact that former Program Manager Nick Du Plessis and fellow guard members had frequented brothels, Medley remarked that at least AGNA knew what the men were up to when they visited prostitutes and if management took away that outlet, the guards would turn to something else.

How can Brinkley possibly think the appointment of Medley is a step forward?

MR. SHAYS: Why do you refer to it as the Gurkha force? I was waiting to hear why you would do that? They’re from Nepal, and they’re not Gurkhas, correct?

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, I differ from the previous panel members’ view. They have been referenced –

MR. SHAYS: I want to be — I want to be very clear.

MR. BRINKLEY: They’ve been — they are — (inaudible) –

MR. SHAYS: I want you to just listen to the question. Were these Gurkhas — are you calling them Gurkhas?

MR. BRINKLEY: The force is called the Gurkha guard force.

MR. SHAYS: Why do you call them the Gurkha guard force if they’re not Gurkhas?

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, I would like to take that question for the record.

MR. SHAYS: No. No, I’m not going to let you do that. Were these Gurkhas?

MR. BRINKLEY: It’s how you might define — your previous panel member had a definition of Gurkhas. We don’t use the same definition.

MR. SHAYS: No, but there is a definition. Gurkhas are individuals, I believe, who have gone through the military and have earned that title. And I just want to know, were these Gurkhas, or were they from Nepal and not Gurkhas? That’s all I’m asking. And it’s a simple answer.

MR. BRINKLEY: Chairman, the Nepalese individuals that are on this force have all served in either the British army, the Indian army, or the Nepalese army, and have met resume approval that is necessary to meet the requirements of this contract.

MR. SHAYS: But they were not Gurkhas, correct?

MR. BRINKLEY: We call them the Gurkha –

MR. SHAYS: I know you call them that. I don’t debate it. That’s my problem. I don’t know why you call them that if they’re not Gurkhas.

At Wackenhut they create their own reality. If they call them Ghurkas, then they’re Ghurkas.

MR.ERVIN : I want to talk about several whistleblowers, James Gordon and John Gorman, and then two other colleagues. Why were these four people — we don’t have the names of the two colleagues of James — of John Gorman. But to your knowledge, why is it that James Gordon was fired? He alleges one thing. What do you understand to be the reason why he was fired by ArmorGroup?

MR. BRINKLEY: First is I only can look at historical record, commissioner. This is before the acquisition. He left in — I — my recollection is February of 2008, and our acquisition was in May of 2008. So in the records that I have — indicate that he voluntarily resigned.

So nobody is saying Gordon’s charges are untrue. Gordon left only 3 months before Wackenhut acquired AG. Exactly how does Wackenhut do due diligence?  Does it have a sort of don’t ask, don’t tell policy?

MR. GRANT S. GREEN:

Mr. Brooks, in your testimony in — certainly in your literature you make a lot of — the code of conduct and the mission and so forth, and I certainly commend you for that, and I’ll quote a couple of short sentences here in the code of conduct, which is very detailed and all-inclusive, and that is “signatories shall respect the dignity of all human beings,” and in the mission statement, I quote, “provide high operational and ethical standards for firms active in the peace and stability operations industry. IPOA is committed to raising the standards of the peace and stability operations industry to ensure sound and ethical professionalism,” et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. I assume ArmorGroup is a member.

MR. BROOKS: Yes, they are.

MR. GREEN: Okay. In a sense, at least in my mind, you almost have a conflict of interest. On one hand, you have set some standards of conduct for your members, of which I just mentioned a few, while at the same time you try, I’m sure, to attract new members who may have difficulty meeting those standards, or they may have different standards. And I think this may be particularly true in the personal security area. What is your incentive for terminating a member, number one, and number two, have you ever terminated a member? I’m not talking about somebody resigning. Have you ever terminated a member, and what is the standard for that?

MR. BROOKS: Great question about — I think five questions, actually — but let’s see if I can address those –

MR. GREEN: Well, I’ll repeat –

MR. BROOKS: I’ll be sure to come back to you if I miss any. But, yes, there’s conflicts of interest. The reason I think our association is attractive to companies is because they do see it as one that — they see it as a selling point to be a member of an ethical association. If the association doesn’t have standards, if it’s not addressing problems within the association, then you lose that selling point. So essentially, getting — losing a company now and then, a member company, is not bad for us necessarily. We’re big enough that one company really doesn’t make a difference, and we’re certainly getting more companies in line to join, so — I mean, we were — we’re at 64 companies now. We were about two thirds of that a year ago.

Mr. Green’s first question was whether IPOA has ever terminated a member. And he only asked two, not five.

I think, yes, there are different standards, and again, I started this association as an academic, and my idea was to have a very large umbrella, get all the companies in, and then get — make sure their standards are compliant.

Exactly what kind of academic was Mr. Brooks? His bio on the IPOA website says that “Previously, he has been an Adjunct Faculty member at American University and an Academic Fellow and Research Associate with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg. That would have been his last ‘academic” position before founding IPOA in 2001. If by academic he means he was essentially doing graduate student type work on a fellowship he is correct. But he was not a teacher at a college or university at that time.

Once we started getting members and we set up our membership committee, the first thing they said is, well, there are certain companies we don’t want to even allow in. So I had a big umbrella idea. The members had a small umbrella idea that said let’s make sure we properly vet these companies when they join, and the creation and the evolution of the Standards Committee, or the Membership Committee, I should say, has been quite interesting. So they are more exclusive. So a number of companies have been excluded.

And I think your third question was actually on — in terms of have — has a company been removed? We hope never to have to actually remove a company. It’s the death penalty essentially as far as we’re concerned. We have other — I think what our Standards Committee is best at is really the behavioral modification. We’ll get a complaint in, or we’ll get a general question about how the companies are operating in these areas, and the Standards Committee can do a number of things, either ask the company to provide information, alter its behavior, or do any other number of things. If the company refuses to do that, then through a process — and I’m happy to share that. We have a poster I can pass on to you that shows a process where the Standards Committee would actually recommend to the full Board of Directors that the company may need to be removed, and then that would be up to the board to do that.

If you are reluctant to remove a company from IPOA then what incentive does a company have to moderate its conduct? And given that member companies pay membership fees how would a company’s removal impact IPOA?

The process is in place. The companies take this very seriously, and it’s quite interesting that when an incident hits the news, the companies often — one of the first things they do is contact our Standards Committee and say here’s our perspective or here’s our side of that particular story. So they do take this quite seriously.

What does IPOA do after a company gives its side of the story? Does it just take the company’s word or does it take any steps to independently verify what the company says? If so, how does it do that?

MR. GREEN: Would the Standards Committee take on the challenge of trying to modify the behavior of ArmorGroup?

MR. BROOKS: If we received a complaint, we would bring the issue up with them, obviously.

Normally, our complaints come in — when they do on these sorts of incidents weeks later, the — obviously, the initial reaction is always contractual or criminal. And that’s not our venue, but if there’s an ethical question that is raised — and we do — we have created our complaint system, so anybody can bring a complaint against our members based on that code of conduct, and yes, we will review it, and that would apply to any company within the association.

Exactly what is not IPOA’s venue, criminal conduct, contractual conduct, or both? And why wouldn’t it be? IPOA had previously initiated an investigation to its former member company Blackwater after the shooting at Nisoor Square, until Blackwater pulled out of IPOA. Is the alleged deliberate shooting of civilians not considered an “ethical” issue?

MR. GREEN: Okay. But it has to be a company within the association that brings that complaint.

MR. BROOKS: No, no, sir. Anybody can bring a complaint, and this includes journalists and includes students. It includes people in the field, non-governmental organizations and so on. And they have brought complaints against our members. And if you want, I can describe the whole process of how it — the complaint goes from there to the Standards Committee, and then how they review it and so on.

Exactly how are complaints handled? Presumably there is a process by which people decide whether the complaint is worth investigating? Assuming it is considered valid what is the timeline for investigating? Who does the investigation? What methodologies are used? What resources are provided? How many non-member company instigated investigations has IPOA conducted over the years? Did any of them result in any kind of negative impact on a member company?

MR. GREEN: Based on what you’ve heard today and what you know about the performance of ArmorGroup in this case, might that not be a reason to terminate their membership?

MR. BROOKS: Again, it would be a process. There still is a due process, and the question would — you know, as we say, bad things happen to the best companies. Now, how does a company deal with it? And from what we’ve seen, ArmorGroup has been quite proactive in dealing with this particular issue once they learned of it. Again, I’m not on the Standards Committee. I don’t have a vote on the Standards Committee. It would be essentially up to a jury of peers to make that decision. And ArmorGroup would certainly be allowed to defend themselves.

Has IPOA bothered to look at the testimony of John Gorman and James Gordon? If they are correct then ArmorGroup conspired in trying to cover the issue, not deal with it. Has IPOA’s Standards Committee even asked ArmorGroup directly about the allegations?

MR. HENKE: Okay. I’m trying to understand if your organization is really — my sense is a Good Housekeeping stamp of approval without the Good Housekeeping. And I’m not being facetious there. I really want to understand what teeth are in your code of conduct. You go to great lengths in your statement to talk about your standards of conduct, committee, and how anyone can file a complaint. That’s anyone, right, any member company, any journalist, any NGO?

MR. BROOKS: You can file a complaint based on our code of conduct — yes, you can.

MR. HENKE: Has anyone yet — since September 1st since POGO went public with these — this gross misconduct — has any complaint been filed against ArmorGroup, WSI, or Wackenhut?

MR. BROOKS: At this point we don’t reveal those complaints until later in the process, and –

MR. HENKE: You won’t tell us here today — (inaudible)?

MR. BROOKS: I’d rather not — yeah.

MR. HENKE: You won’t tell us, or you’d rather not?

MR. BROOKS: I would rather not, to be quite frank. (Inaudible) –

MR. HENKE: (Inaudible) –

MR. BROOKS: We try and keep the system –

MR. HENKE: Have you filed a complaint?

MR. BROOKS: I don’t file — (inaudible) –

MR. HENKE: Has the organization?

MR. BROOKS: — on behalf of the organization, I won’t.

MR. HENKE: Okay. I’m filing a complaint now.

MR. BROOKS: Okay. I will send you information on the filing process.

MR. HENKE: Now I’m in your system and I want to see what happens to this code of conduct in your Standards Committee.

MR. BROOKS: (Inaudible) — complaint moves forward, and –

MR. HENKE: I’m filing the complaint against ArmorGroup for their gross misconduct and the violation of your organization’s code of conduct.

MR. : Bob, can I just interject just quickly? I would like you to answer the question for the question. I understand if you want to do it. I’d like you to answer whether there is presently on file –

MR. BROOKS: To be honest –

MR. : — a complaint against either ArmorGroup, WSI, or Wackenhut.

MR. BROOKS: To be honest, I’d have to actually check the policy on that, but I would prefer — (inaudible) –

MR. : Check the policy on whether there is a complaint?

MR. BROOKS: No, on the revealing of the complaint if there is a complaint, because — (inaudible) –

MR. : I would like for you to just take a minute before we end this hearing, check the policy, and get back to us.

MR. BROOKS: No, you know what? I’ll tell you right now at the risk of annoying my membership, but there’s been no complaint to date on ArmorGroup or Wackenhut — (inaudible).

MR. : No complaints to date at all?

MR. BROOKS: No, not — but these complaints usually take some time before they actually do come in. On our side –

MR. : Yeah.

MR. BROOKS: — it’s an ethics complaint rather than a –

MR. : It’s been 13 days, and no one, much less a member company, has said there’s something wrong here. I want to complain?

MR. BROOKS: That’s — (inaudible).

MR. : How many members do you have?

MR. BROOKS: We have 64 members currently.

MR. : Sixty-four member companies. No one’s said a word.

MR. BROOKS: Well, they said a word.

(Cross talk.)

MR. BROOKS: Well, I’m sure they’re talking about it.

MR. : Nobody’s filed a formal complaint.

MR. BROOKS: Yeah.

MR. : Nobody’s filed a complaint. I just think that’s egregious. It just doesn’t — I mean, I — this distinction of –

MR. BROOKS: Keep in mind most of the complaints come from outside the association, and –

MR. : Like mine just did.

MR. BROOKS: Yeah.

Personally I find this whole exchange mindboggling. No other company would file a complaint? I mean this is, to say the least, a very competitive field. It is routine for companies to file lawsuits against each other or to challenge a contract award in order to get business. Yet not a single company, either from within or outside IPOA, either under their own name, or, say, using their grandmother, has done so?

MR. : — get the question, and you can do that in your own time. You go to great lengths in your statement to talk about peacekeeping missions, first, humanitarian missions on a scale from left to right, peacekeeping missions, humanitarian missions, peacekeeping missions. Is what’s going on in Afghanistan right now a peace operation? The International Peace Operations Association — (inaudible) –

MR. BROOKS: We didn’t keep that name officially. It’s just IPOA now. But I would actually — it gets into academic definitions. I would consider it a stability operation, not a peace operation. It seems to me it’s more of a military operation rather than an attempt to keep the peace.

When and why did IPOA change its name? Should we take a leaf from Prince and now refer to IPOA as the trade group formerly known as the International peace Operations Association? What is the difference between stability operation and a peace operation?

MR. : I don’t disagree with you that it’s a very dangerous place, but I would say that in Afghanistan where 40-some, 50-some American troops are killed in a month, it’s not close, okay? I’m getting at this issue of where is the line on inherently governmental? Can you comment on that?

MR. BROOKS: Yes, I can. Actually, I think a lot of it comes down to sort of a pragmatic perspective, and again, this is how we got into it. The reality is the government is trying to do some fairly significant policies, and it has a certain limited capability to do that. I like to point out we have probably the most effective, most professional military in history, the United States does, I should say. But to do that, it’s outsources a lot of the aspects that, really, you don’t want soldiers doing. You know, they may have been cleaning toilets or flipping eggs in the past, but that’s something that obviously should be done by contractors. You don’t want a limited number of volunteers, the professional soldiers that we have, doing that sort of stuff. They should be focused on the policy aspect.

Policy aspect? Is that newspeak for combat?

Now, there’s the issue of security, and that’s the one that’s sort of the grey area. At what point, you know, can you use private security? I think if they’re protecting something, if it’s not a state-on-state war and everything — it’s really not that difficult of a choice. It’s simple security. And this is an issue I think that gets to the whole Mantro (ph) document. You have illegal combatants. You have issues of — when you’re protecting warehouses, do you need to use soldiers to protect humanitarian warehouses and things like that? It’s an issue that has to be able to evolve. I think the U.S. government has several definitions of what inherently governmental is, but I think we have to be practical when we make these decisions. And if we make a decision to say that, you know, all security work has to be done by the government, it’s essentially going to hamstring our larger policy issues.

No lawyer who has studies this issue thinks it is simple. For over two decades at least there has been a raging debate over how to classify security contractors, determine how they fit into national and international law, define the circumstances in which they can use force et cetera. They have yet to come to come to a resolution.

MR. SHAYS: I am stunned that your organization did not know about these problems, since everyone else seemed to, and when I say your organization, your organization out of country ’cause your folks in-country knew. They knew. And it says to me there is something so incredible sick about your organization that that would be the case. It says something very sick about a rat that says, “warning, this project is infested with rats. Be cautious of what you say and do around those suspected of being rats. Rats can cost you your job and your family.” Quote, “Never rat on your friend, and always keep your mouth shut.”

That would explain, Mr. Brinkley, why your management folks don’t know much, because there’s this kind of sickness, cancer in your organization.

MR. SHAYS: Mr. Brinkley, are you surprised that you don’t know anything, because you have to be a fool for someone to tell you — because you don’t seem to be at all outraged by the fact that this happened. There is a culture within your company that discourages people from speaking out. I would’ve thought that you, as the person in charge, would’ve said this is unbelievable. Why wasn’t I notified immediately? You’re out. I would’ve called State and said I have just been notified a few minutes ago, this is the case, and so on. I didn’t see that. I don’t feel it. I’ve been listening to this panel thinking ho hum, ho hum, ho hum. You don’t seem to get it, honestly. I mean no disrespect, but you do not seem to get it. What you have done by your conduct today is a strong indication that you know you better not try to expose — I’d like to ask –

MR. BRINKLEY: Commissioner, if I might –

MR. SHAYS: Yeah.

MR. BRINKLEY: — Mr. Chairman, I can assure that I am outraged. I met with the commission last week. Unfortunately, the chair was not there. I am outraged. I am embarrassed. I am humiliated.

MR. SHAYS: That is –

MR. BRINKLEY: We take this very, very seriously, so the idea that we don’t –

MR. SHAYS: If you take it seriously, then tell me what action you’ve taken to say to Alyssa Bowell (ph) we appreciate you more than the scum who did this? Give me one indication. MR. BRINKLEY: First –

MR. SHAYS: Did you ever say to your subcontractor that maybe you need to hire Terry Pearson back because he’s the one good guy in this group who spoke out? Have you done anything like that?

MR. BRINKLEY: I have not taken that action yet because that is — his actions are under investigation. He belongs to another company. I would — (inaudible) –

MR. SHAYS: No, not another company. He’s your subcontractor. Let me tell you — and this is the thing that bugs me more than anything. Seventy percent of our contractors are subcontractors, and somehow we hide and we put a curtain in front of them and say, you know, we can’t look at them. We can’t deal with them. We only deal with the project. That has got to stop. Why do you think that Terry was fired? Because he spoke out and because the sub was concerned that you would take action against the sub.

MR. BRINKLEY: I categorically deny that.

MR. SHAYS: Okay, tell me why.

MR. BRINKLEY: Because that is not our policy. We would not do that.

And we all know that nobody at AG or Wackenhut would dare to do anything against policy.

MR. SHAYS:

Mr. Brinkley, just to follow up on that last exchange, I hadn’t planned to, but I’ll do so now.

I just want to go over this one more time. You’re saying, you said earlier in the earlier round, that it is possible that the State Department, somebody in the State Department may well have approved of this surveillance mission, this operation snack pack. I just wanted to give you another opportunity to clarify that.

MR. BRINKLEY: When I read the allegation, we made an inquiry. I was led to believe that it was planned. And I was informed that, from the person that indicated that, it was approved by the department. Now, that is under investigation, commissioner. I do not know the final determination.

Did State really authorize that? If someone did let’s find out who.

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David Isenberg is an independent, Washington-D.C. based analyst and writer on military, foreign policy, national and international security issues and the author of Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq.   In addition to his contributions to the Private Military Herald, Isenberg also blogs regularly at the Partnership For A Secure America.

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