Posts Tagged ‘Blackwater’

Death and Politics For Contractors–A Cautionary Tale

Thursday, September 17th, 2009

By Matt Loe

The other day I was watching a show called Democracy Now headlined by Amy Goodman and Jeremy Scahill, and I was appalled.  They had the family of Adam Hermanson on the show, and the supposed focus was the accidental death of Adam Hermanson in Iraq.  You would think the show would be centered on who did the electrical work that caused the death of this security contractor?  Or maybe even a focus on the lack of management and quality control by the contracting officers and construction company that was tasked with building Camp Olympia and it’s facilities?  But that wasn’t the case, and instead it was a disgusting display of politics.

What the show presented was Adam’s family being used as pawns by both Amy and Jeremy. Or basically,  the family was being used in Amy and Jeremy’s overall goal of demonizing security contractors in this war. They spent the show ripping apart Triple Canopy, or Obama’s New Blackwater, and chose not to focus on how this accident happened and who was responsible. What an insult to the family and friends!

Worse yet, every time Jeremy is on that show, Amy plugs his slanderous and poorly researched book about Blackwater.  And during this deal, he was completely cozying up to the family, and wrapping himself up in the death of the ‘poor victim’ of this accident, that happened to be a security contractor.

But wait, isn’t that security contractor named Adam Hermanson, a mercenary and member of Obama’s Blackwater (Triple Canopy)? I am just curious on how all of a sudden Adam changes from a ‘blood thirsty, war mongering mercenary’ to victim who so desperately needs Scahill and Goodman to defend them?

Lets take that a step further.  Would Jeremy or Amy have sat down with Adam when he was alive and have a beer with the guy? How about the family? Oh but love the security contractor when it is politically convenient and could potentially sell books.

I know I would have liked to of hung out with Adam, because we probably would have known some of the same people.  I know I would have asked him about his contract, and his thoughts about the pay and everything…typical contractor conversation. I just wonder if Adam would have liked to have sat down with Jeremy and Amy, and do the same thing?

Now if I was to sit down with Adam’s ghost, the conversation would have been a little different. I would have asked him what happened exactly.  Then I would have promised him that I would find out who was responsible for the poor electrical work and managing that work.  That is the least I could do.  I would also ask if he would want Amy and Jeremy to use his memory for political purposes and to sell books, and if he approved of this show.

Would Adam want his good name associated with these folks that basically would have had nothing to do with him prior to his death? After all, according to these two, Adam’s service to country, both as a contractor and in the military was worthless.  All of the guys that Adam knew that died in the war, all died for a worthless and despicable cause, according Scahill and Goodman, and I wonder what Adam would have thought about that?

That is what I kept thinking during this show, and it made me want to puke. It pissed me off, because I doubt that Adam would want to have his name associated with a group that certainly despised him and his sacrifice in this war.

The other angle on this, is that Triple Canopy just lost a family member as well.  They owe it to the family and friends to get the story correct on what exactly happened. That requires an investigation, and that can be difficult to accomplish in some circumstances. It is important to remember that this is a war zone, and not some city in America. The family deserves to know what happened, but they also have to understand that it takes a little bit of work and time to put together exactly what happened in some cases. But I do agree that Triple Canopy should work as fast as possible to get the family all the information and help they need.  The security contracting community and Triple Canopy lost a comrade too, and we all would like to know what happened.

Now if TC was responsible for the wiring, and they were covering things up to hide some kind of liability for such a thing, then of course they should be held accountable. But listening to Amy and Jeremy, you would think that Triple Canopy is already guilty, and that is politics.

That brings up another point.  Scahill and Goodman both fueled the idea that Triple Canopy was trying to cover this up. Ok guys, then investigate that responsibly, and see where it goes.  Try being more journalist, than political hacks, and maybe my community and the family would have more respect for what you are doing.  But instead of focusing on who actually built the facilities, they decided to focus on demonizing the security contracting industry. Is that journalism, or is that an agenda?  It would be like if someone got killed in a freak accident at a movie theater, and then going after the the victim’s employer because you don’t like their employer.  It is a strawman attack, and this bias and distraction does a huge disservice to the family and the memory of Adam.

So lets talk about Camp Olympia.  According to the comments section at MsSparky’s blog (the Hermanson family has made comments there as well, so that is why it is relevant), the readers had some interesting points to make. I found out about this, just by typing ‘Camp Olympia, Iraq’, in a Google search, and it came up on the first page.

For one, it is alleged that the First Kuwaiti Construction Company was the company that built up Camp Olympia.(says Sam) This is the same company that built the new Embassy compound in Baghdad.  There is even  a wikipedia page about the company that Jeremy and Amy could have visited, to learn more about the company and it’s history of faulty construction. I know Jeremy and Amy are aware of the construction problems at the embassy, so it is curious why they didn’t make the connection or even do a basic Google search about Camp Olympia?

According to the wiki, the Washington Post wrote a critical article of the company, ‘both for the physical quality of their work, and for allegations of labor abuse which came to light in testimony given by former First Kuwaiti employees’.  If I was Adam’s family, those are the folks I would be mad at if they were the ones that were responsible for the construction at the camp.  I would also be angry at the government for not monitoring the construction of the camp and applying some kind of quality control.

Finally, and I want to leave the reader on this important note.  You should talk with your family about your final wishes if killed out there.(speaking to my fellow security contractors)  Your death, like in the case of Adam Hermanson, could be used by some morally and ethically corrupt individuals who are just trying to sell books and political agendas.

If you are a family member of a contractor, it would also be wise to think what your loved one’s wishes would have been in regards to relations with the media.  Your actions can forever impact the memory and good name of your deceased loved one, and you need to be protective and respectful of that memory. And in the case of Adam Hermanson, I just don’t think he would have sat down and had a beer with Jeremy Scahill or Amy Goodman while he was alive, and I am pretty sure Adam would not have approved of those two using his good name to sell books and agendas.

I could be wrong, and I apologize in advance if that is the wishes of Adam.  I am just looking at this, as if I was in Adam’s shoes. I am a security contractor and I have worked in these camps in Iraq. I have seen first hand the burned out trailers caused by electrical fires, and I am completely aware of accidental electrical deaths.  Believe me, I have showered in plenty of facilities that gave me pause.  But I also know enough about the system to put blame, where blame is due.  In the case of Adam Hermanson, the blame needs to be placed on who built the facility, and who was tasked with managing and monitoring that contract.

Unfortunately, politics seems to be more important to the media these days, than respecting the memory of a security contractor or finding out the truth of what happened to him.

See article source here.

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Matt Loe is a former Marine, a seasoned security contractor and a  frequent contributor to the Private Military Herald.  His blog, Feral Jundi, is an excellent source for news and commentary related to the private security sector as well as the U.S. military and foreign policy.

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ArmorGroup Kept Kabul Contract Despite Record

Sunday, September 13th, 2009
The New York Times

WASHINGTON — When a security guard at the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, was leaving for breakfast Monday morning, he froze at the sight of a crude poster of a rat hanging on his door.

“Warning!” the poster said in stark, black letters. “Rats can cost you your job and your family.”

The guard was a whistle-blower who had told of security lapses and lewd, drunken bacchanals by fellow workers, sparking an outcry and enraging Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Now he wonders whether he should have kept his mouth shut.

“Threats are still running rampant here,” he said in a telephone conversation from Kabul, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. “So even though it looks like State may finally turn things around, no one’s ready to celebrate yet.”

Such skepticism may be warranted.

A review of two years of e-mail messages, letters and memos reveals that the State Department had long known of the serious problems with ArmorGroup, the contractor chosen to protect its embassy. The complaints went beyond the lurid pranks that made headlines, the documents show, and included serious understaffing, bullying by management, petty corruption and abusive work conditions.

In fact, the deficiencies became so severe that they threatened the security of the compound, the documents show, and State Department officials withheld payments to ArmorGroup as a way to compel it to comply with the terms of its agreement. On a few occasions, government officials warned the company that if it did not correct the most egregious problems it would lose the five-year, $189 million deal.

Yet both times the contract came up for renewal, in 2008 and 2009, the State Department opted to extend it, officials confirmed.

The troubles with the ArmorGroup contract, and the State Department’s frustrated dealings with the company over two years and through two administrations, illustrate how the government has become dependent on the private security companies that work in war zones, and has struggled to manage companies that themselves are sometimes loosely run and do not always play by the government’s rules.

With a stretched military, the government relies on the security companies themselves to vet, train, and discipline the guards, all at the lowest cost.

“It’s expensive for the State Department to withdraw a contract from one company, rebid the project and award it to a new one,” said Janet Goldstein, a Washington lawyer who represents one of the ArmorGroup whistleblowers. “So businesses know that once they get a contract, State may ding them around a little bit, but it’s not going to fire them.”

The perils of this reliance were most graphically illustrated in Iraq in 2007, when security guards from another contractor, Blackwater, were involved in shootings that left 17 civilians dead on a Baghdad street. But interviews and documents show that the ArmorGroup affair, in its mundane, unsavory details, offers perhaps a more representative look inside the troubled relationship between contractors and the government in war zones.

State Department officials acknowledge they had a litany of complaints about the company, none of which, they insist, compromised the security of the embassy. But they profess to being deeply embarrassed by reports of parties where security guards were photographed naked, fondling and urinating on each other.

“I’ve been doing this for 37 years; I’m proud of what I do,” said Patrick F. Kennedy, the undersecretary of state for management who oversees outside contractors. But, he added, “This is humiliating.”

Mr. Kennedy, however, defended the State Department’s overall handling of the contract. The frequent letters of complaint the government sent to ArmorGroup, he said, were evidence that the department was keeping close tabs on the company. The “greatest majority” of the failures cited in the letters were addressed, he said.

Part of the problem, officials said, was that the guards are housed in a complex six miles from the embassy, Camp Sullivan, with little oversight by State Department officials.

Susan Pitcher, a spokeswoman for Wackenhut Services, the American subsidiary of the Danish company that owns ArmorGroup, referred questions to the State Department, saying only that it was cooperating with the government’s investigation.

On Monday, the independent Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan will hold a hearing to examine the State Department’s oversight of the contract. Christopher Shays, a former congressman and co-chairman of the commission, said there was “a serious failure on the part of the State Department in being unable to compel the contractor to fulfill its commitment.”

The disclosures, which were originally made by a nonprofit organization, Project on Government Oversight, deeply rattled the State Department. At a staff meeting following the release of the group’s report, senior officials said, Mrs. Clinton vented her anger about the lurid pictures. Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired Army general who became President Obama’s ambassador to Afghanistan last May, was livid, an official said, because he had never been briefed about the problems.

Despite their unease with contractors, officials acknowledged the department had no choice but to keep using them.

“In situations where there is a surge of intense security requirements, it is a real challenge,” said Jacob J. Lew, the deputy secretary of state for management and resources. “We cannot reduce the security presence.”

The State Department was not in a buyer’s market when it looked for a company to protect its embassy in Kabul.

It picked ArmorGroup in March 2007, after its previous choice, MVM, proved unable to marshal the necessary personnel or equipment, officials said. Of the eight companies that bid for the contract the second time around, only two were deemed technically capable. ArmorGroup was the cheapest.

The company’s most recent contract extension was granted in June this year, after a Senate hearing in which one of its executives, Samuel Brinkley, a Wackenhut vice president, said in sworn testimony that his company was in full compliance with the terms of its contract, and a State Department official, William H. Moser, a deputy assistant secretary of state, also under oath, said he was satisfied with the company’s performance.

In interviews, ArmorGroup whistleblowers said they felt betrayed by the testimony. By many measures, they said, things were worse, not better. After largely uneventful company barbecues morphed into what have been described as scenes from “The Lord of the Flies,” at least a dozen of the men started a document trail of their own, sending e-mail messages and photographs to the Project on Government Oversight.

According to interviews and those documents, from July 2007 to April 2009, the State Department issued ArmorGroup at least nine warnings, nearly one every other month, about contract violations that ranged from mundane concerns about the company’s ability to keep accurate personnel logs, to more critical concerns about corruption among company managers and the hardships faced by sleep-deprived, underpaid guards — the majority of them Gurkhas from Nepal — who could not understand simple commands in English.

While the Gurkhas were largely the source of the language problems, the lewd hazing rituals were largely the activity of the native English speakers, a mix of Americans, South Africans, New Zealanders and Australians.

In 2008, after ArmorGroup was acquired by the Danish company, G4S, Wackenhut informed the State Department it was taking control of the Kabul contract, and promised to fix any problems.

Government officials agreed to give the new owners a chance. According to their own correspondence, their optimism seemed to dim fairly quickly.

On Aug. 22, 2008, the State Department wrote to ArmorGroup to express concerns that staffing shortages were so severe the company might not be able to provide security after a situation with mass casualties.

On Sept. 21, 2008, the State Department deducted $2.4 million in payments from ArmorGroup, warning that its failure to provide a sufficient number of guards “gravely endangers the performance of guard services.”

In March 2009, the department again advised ArmorGroup that it had “grave concerns” about staffing shortages, noting that inspectors on a recent tour found 18 guardposts left uncovered.

In April, it denied ArmorGroup’s request for a third waiver to the requirement that it teach its foreign guards English.

A month later, without much explanation, ArmorGroup told the State Department that deficiencies relating to language and staffing had been resolved. And a month after that, a senior State Department official told the Senate Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight that “despite contractual deficiencies, the performance by ArmorGroup North America has been and is sound.”

“I sat in the audience that day, and shook my head in disbelief,” said James Gordon, a former ArmorGroup executive who has filed a whistleblower’s lawsuit against the company. He says he was forced out for complaining about the problems. “I knew that conditions at Camp Sullivan were deteriorating, that the contract continued to be understaffed, that the conditions in Kabul were getting more dangerous, and that the U.S. Embassy was facing grave threats.”

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Book Review: Master of War, by Suzanne Simons

Saturday, September 5th, 2009

By Jake Allen

Master of War, Blackwater USA’s Erik Prince and the Business of War by Suzanne Simons is a must read for anyone looking for a down-the-middle analysis of both the history of Blackwater and the explosion of the private military sector in the 21st century.  Simons is no industry apologist.  Nor does she put forth the typical and by now predictable fare we are used to reading about Prince, Blackwater or the industry at large.  Her style is objective and balanced and thus very refreshing and thought provoking.

Though the title leads one to believe that the scope of the book is only that of Mr. Prince readers will be pleasantly surprised to find that Simons tackles many of the larger questions such as why and how the private security industry was able to blossom in the post Iraq invasion.  It’s so easy these days for critics of the industry to blame the participants instead of focusing their spotlights on why their existence is even necessary.

I found the stories from Prince’s upbringing in Michigan fascinating.  Simons narrative style takes the reader on a compelling personal journey from Prince’s privileged upbringing in Michigan where he learned lessons of life and business from his father whose death forced an early exit from the Navy and allowed him to apply his substantial means towards his vision for the future of military training.

By Suzanne Simons

By Suzanne Simons

Two well known but apt phrases come to mind when thinking about the Blackwater story.  The first is, ‘It’s not what you know but who you know.’ Simons illustrates how Prince’s access to government officials at the highest levels are simply unprecedented and allowed the fledgling firm with its unique concept to win opportunities that eluded many of the older more established defense contractors.

The other phrase that comes to mind is, ‘Life is all about timing.’ Blackwater was founded by Prince and Gary Jackson barely three years before the attacks on 9-11 but that seminal event in world history forced the U.S. government to reach out for services that in many cases only Prince was willing to provide.  Perhaps no other company in the world would come to benefit, on a percent growth basis, to the degree  Blackwater did.  Simons details both the early days before the war in Iraq and the explosive growth that the company experienced during the war.

Speaking of timing this book comes out at a time when Blackwater, now Xe, is experiencing a new wave of allegations, some of which are directed specifically and personally at Prince.  The looming trial of 4 Blackwater contractors for their part in the Nisour Square shooting will come to blanket the front pages of newspapers around the world and mixed in with the facts and the testimony at the trial will be huge doses of conjecture from all sides in the media.  I encourage you to read this book, especially now,  to put into context the company and its founder so that you are able to digest all that you read.

Well, enough from me, Ms. Simons was generous enough to spend some time on the phone talking about her book and what led her to write it.  Apologies for the audio quality in some places, it smooths out after the first couple of minutes.

[podcast]http://www.privatemilitaryherald.com/podcast/SuzanneSimons.mp3[/podcast]

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Animal House: The Real Story

Saturday, September 5th, 2009

By Tim Lynch

You have to admit that the current guard force at the U.S. Embassy Kabul know how to get attention. The rash of stories which broke last Wednesday were amusing to say the least. The story broke with a news release from a group called “Project on Government Oversight” (POGO) who had received pictures and written complaints from a group of contractors at the embassy and given the nature of the pictures it went viral.

I was the project manager for the first group of civilian contractors who relieved the Marines (weapons company 2/6) at that embassy in 2005. At the time the contract called for 146 expatriates, 245 third country nationals and around 75 local Afghans. There are things I know which I can not discuss in an open form but let me tell you this; there are serious serious, problems with that contract which have little to do with the behavior highlighted in the tsunami of international coverage.

Managing contracts of this size in Iraq or Afghanistan is an impossible job and there is a very small pool of talent who have the ability and energy to do it well. I came to Kabul from the American Embassy in Baghdad where I first joined the circuit with a British firm. I received a call around Midnight on a Sunday from the company recruiter who I could barely understand and he said in a very loud voice “mate do you have your kit?” I replied in the affirmative and he says “I need a fill in Baghdad mate can you leave in two days?” I again said yes and he yelled “great mate see you in 24 hours.” The next morning I had a ticket to London and I left the following day. It was a weird thing to do but I hated being retired and was a really crappy civilian. I was lucky, the project manager in Baghdad, who would come to back fill me in Kabul two years later was one of the best I have ever seen. He was from Zimbabwe, had extensive combat experience, was of the quiet confident type who paid keen attention to what his expats did both on and off duty.

The main reason why managing these contracts is so difficult is that it is impossible to stay ahead of the stupidity curve your men will generate. There is no way to anticipate it because some of these guys do the most unbelievably stupid things sober; add alcohol and the potential for Darwin Award level stupidity goes up exponentially. In the military I knew my Marines well because we spent so much time together – often in prolonged field exercises. Your average young enlisted Marine has the ability to do stupid things too but they fall into an easily anticipated set of behaviors which savvy leadership can recognize and at times circumvent. Not true with contractors – some of stories I have heard are amazing.

I hated working at the American Embassy in Kabul for a number of reasons. My personal antipathy unquestionably clouds my judgment on the ability, competence, and usefulness of the arrogant snobbish bureaucrats who work there. I showed up on the 7th of March, most of the expats arrived on a charter flight the next day and that ride in was so bad that one of them immediately resigned. We were housed in a hastily built camp which had not been completed – the roof was not even on the barracks. Our Nepalese arrived in April but we had to assume the contract on 17 March. We had been set up to fail because the department in charge of our contract, the Regional Security Officer’s (RSO’s) clearly did not want the Marines to go – I knew some of the Marines and they were feeding me the inside scoop.

Most of the expats who arrived for the contract had worked for the same company during the first Afghan election and they were predominantly from the UK. They were also an older crowed with the talents one expects to find in retired military men so organizing and starting the contract was much easier than the industry norm. Our cookhouse was a nightmare but we had a PA from Scotland who got it sorted out but not before we lost men to hospital to all manner of food borne parasites. The RSO’s would not give us the weapons called for in the contract so we had the send out raiding parties of guys who had worked the election and had weapons stashed or knew where to find them. It was a nightmare and I never got along with the RSO shop but I don’t want to start telling old sea stories or start in on State Department RSO’s. They have plenty of talent in that program and one of them, Tim Sullivan, for whom the current guard camp is named, was one of the best all around operators I have ever met.

The problem with the current guard force is that they are on a shit contract. Ignore the money value published in the papers – that number is for five years executed at full value which is impossible to do . Armor Group North America is losing big money on that job and they are about to lose a lot more. I was asked by a few companies to consult on their bids for it back in 2006 and my answer was always the same – don’t bid because if you win you’ll lose money. There were requirements in the contract that could not be filled. The number of security clearance holding Americans was excessive and unnecessary (it has been modified now.) The skill set required in the contract was out of all proportion to the tasks actually executed by the guards (these too have since been modified) and the training requirements were completely unrealistic given the amount of time the State Department would allow for the guard force to train prior to assuming the contract.

The several hundred page request for proposal (RFP) was full of legalize contract language which was there for the same reason congressional bills are several thousands pages of incomprehensible gibberish – to hide things. In the case of the embassy contract it was penalties for failing to meet certain stipulations. The only companies who could have actually met the requirements at the time were Blackwater and Triple Canopy but they could never submit a bid low enough to win because they have to run the training infrastructure back in the States required by the contract and thus were forced to bid realistic numbers. They were never in the running. All of the contracts being let for security and everything else go to the lowest bidder.

When we started the bridge contract back in 2005 I told the men there that although our billets suck and we look like clowns (we had no uniforms and looked like a motorcycle gang on post with civvie clothing and old AK 47’s with chest rigs. I thought it looked kind of cool but it wasn’t good for morale) that experience tells us that we will be on the job for years, not the six months of the contract and that the pay is good, risk is low, and thus by definition life is good. I was proved correct – the bridge contract lasted two years before a company successfully took over. The first company to win the contract was MVM and their genius plan was to bring in South African passport holding Vamba tribal fighters from Namibia to work as the senior guards and “english speaking ” junior guards from Peru. The South African plan met the terms of the contract but turned out to be a disaster. When the Peruvians arrived not one of them could speak a word of English. I was there for that too and am thus unable to go into the details.

When Armor Group won they were heading down the same path as MVM but at the last minute the CEO came in, immediately fired his management team and entered into negotiations with the existing project manager for him and his crew to come aboard. I am hesitant to go into detail due to an acute congenital fear of lawyers. Runs in my family according to my Father, but suffice it say the pay for new joins was low and did not favor Americans who cannot be paid on leave by an American company without becoming an employee with the full benefit and tax load. That lasted a little less than a year until the PM got bored and left which caused the immediate exodus of all the old guards who Armor group wanted to be rid of so they could bring in guys at a much reduced daily rate. You get what you pay for in this industry and Armor Group was not paying much.

The pay thing is a problem which can worked through with good on the ground leadership and incentives for people who are on their second, third or fourth year of the contract; the real problem is with the living conditions and job requirements of the guard force. The average living space per man in Camp Sullivan is less than the square footage required for inmates in federal penitentiaries. I put that in writing in a memo to the RSO when the camp was being built which may help explain the stained relationship I had with him. The recreation facilities are inadequate and the gym full of third rate Turkish equipment. There is no space on the camp for the men to do anything outside of their crammed barracks and they have little ability to get off camp. When you are designing camps to house hundreds of guards for years at a time you have to pay attention to their morale recreation and welfare needs which is something the military excels at. If you do not think through what they are going to do off duty as thoroughly as their on duty tasks than you are set up to fail.

Now that the furor of last week has died down it appears that our Secretary of State has the situation in hand. Surprisingly enough she found the behavior completely inappropriate and a threat to good order and discipline. I don’t understand that – what business is it of hers what consenting adults do? Is that not the lesson of the Lewinsky affair? Maybe it was because the guards were having these stupid parties on a facility rented by the State Department which drew her condemnation – but the oval office is even more important a government place than Camp Sullivan isn’t it? Or maybe she was upset because management was encouraging this nonsense which means there is a disparity in power between the individuals involved which makes even their consent suspect….you know like the disparity of power between the President of the United States and an intern? No wait that can’t be it…anyway the boss has taken a stand against serial sexual predators (first time for everything) and fired the whole crew.

But that contract will still be have a ton of problems and the men working there will continue to be even more miserable than the FOB bound military who at least have good gyms, pizza hut, lots of girls on their bases, green beans coffee houses etc..

There is only way to fix the Embassy contract and that is to cut the number of guards in half, make them all Americans and pull them into the embassy where they can work and live along side the other Americans. The security guards are not now and never have been able to use the gyms or bars or tennis courts or swimming pool which are all reserved for embassy staff. That should change. The security guard contract should also be combined with the Ambassadors PSD contract (currently Blackwater and before them DynCorp) so that guards joining the contract can work their way up onto the Ambassador’s detail – that way when a new guy joins that team he has a clue about Afghanistan. Knowing how to “evasive drive” or shoot is useless here – knowing the people, how they drive and what is normal behavior is critical and you can’t learn that in security “operator” school. What are the chances that the State Department is aware enough to recognize the problems they created on this contract and then really fix them? Absolutely zero. Like I said I hated working that contract because the people you are serving are just plain rude, nasty, arrogant and worse yet completely clueless about what is happening outside the walls of their plush digs.

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Tim Lynch is a former U.S. Marine Corps Infantry Officer.  He’s also a seasoned private security contractor and runs his own blog at Free Range International which chronicles his on-the-ground perspective of life in Afghanistan.

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