Posts Tagged ‘contracting’

ArmorGroup photos evoke Abu Ghraib comparison

Tuesday, September 15th, 2009
Associated Press – WASHINGTON — A member of a federal commission investigating wartime spending said Monday that photos showing private security guards in various stages of nudity at drunken parties may be as damaging to U.S. interests in Afghanistan as images of detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib were in Iraq.

Dov Zakheim, a former Pentagon comptroller, made the comment at a hearing Monday held by the Commission on Wartime Contracting on allegations of lewd behavior and sexual misconduct by employees of ArmorGroup North America, the company hired to protect the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.

Zakheim said the photos are circulating heavily on the Internet and give Muslims in Afghanistan a negative image of the United States and make the jobs of American officials there all the more difficult.

Patrick Kennedy, under secretary of state for management, acknowledged the department should have been paying closer attention to the activities of the ArmorGroup guards at their living quarters near the embassy.

ArmorGroup’s owner, Wackenhut Services, said it erred by not immediately telling the State Department about an alcohol-related incident involving its guards that proved far more serious than company officials first believed.

“I am not here to defend the indefensible,” said Samuel Brinkley, a Wackenhut vice president.

A manager for ArmorGroup counseled nine guards after they got drunk at a bar near their living quarters in Kabul on August 10, according to Brinkley. But after photos surfaced showing the guards had been at a party where ArmorGroup employees engaged in lewd and inappropriate behavior, they realized they made a mistake by not alerting U.S. officials. Photos showed guards and supervisors in various stages of nudity at parties flowing with alcohol.

Brinkley said the manager’s response, which included a temporary ban on alcohol, seemed adequate at the time.

“In retrospect, we were wrong in not notifying the State Department,” Brinkley said in testimony.

Kennedy told the commission the State Department is very concerned about ArmorGroup’s delays in reporting its knowledge of any misconduct by its employees.

The State Department has been sharply criticized for its management and oversight of the security contract at one of the country’s most important diplomatic outposts. In addition to the allegations of misconduct, other problems have included a shortage of guards and inferior equipment.

As the department’s top management officer, Kennedy said he takes full responsibility for having failed to prevent the problems that reportedly ranged from out-of-control parties to ArmorGroup supervisors frequenting brothels in Kabul.

The State Department has launched an investigation into ArmorGroup’s handling of the $189 million contract embassy security contract. So far, at least 16 ArmorGroup guards and supervisors have been fired or resigned and alcohol has been banned from the guard’s camp.

Kennedy said no decision will be made on whether to terminate the contract with ArmorGroup until the investigation is complete.

Members of the commission pressed Kennedy to be more aggressive, saying the evidence already available is enough to warrant firing ArmorGroup, which was awarded the contract to protect the embassy in March 2007.

“To me, it’s just totally out of control and it’s been going on for a long time,” said Michael Thibault, co-chairman of the commission.

Commissioner Clark Ervin asked Kennedy to pledge to terminate the contract if the investigation proves all the allegations prove to be true.

Kennedy refused to commit, saying the inquiry needs to run its course. However, Kennedy added, “We are seeing a very, very serious case being made for termination.”

Kennedy insisted the safety of department personnel working at the embassy has never been compromised because of ArmorGroup’s failures.

Brinkley told the commission that he is “personally embarrassed” by the incidents that have become public in the last two weeks. In addition to the August 10 incident, Brinkley cited two other others in which ArmorGroup guards acted inappropriately.

Brinkley said he and other company executives were unaware of a June 15 party at Camp Sullivan, the guards’ living quarters near the embassy, until an independent watchdog group in Washington issued a report with photos detailing ArmorGroup’s problems in Afghanistan.

ArmorGroup was awarded the Kabul embassy security contract in March 2007. Wackenhut acquired ArmorGroup in May 2008.

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ArmorGroup Kept Kabul Contract Despite Record

Sunday, September 13th, 2009
The New York Times

WASHINGTON — When a security guard at the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, was leaving for breakfast Monday morning, he froze at the sight of a crude poster of a rat hanging on his door.

“Warning!” the poster said in stark, black letters. “Rats can cost you your job and your family.”

The guard was a whistle-blower who had told of security lapses and lewd, drunken bacchanals by fellow workers, sparking an outcry and enraging Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Now he wonders whether he should have kept his mouth shut.

“Threats are still running rampant here,” he said in a telephone conversation from Kabul, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisal. “So even though it looks like State may finally turn things around, no one’s ready to celebrate yet.”

Such skepticism may be warranted.

A review of two years of e-mail messages, letters and memos reveals that the State Department had long known of the serious problems with ArmorGroup, the contractor chosen to protect its embassy. The complaints went beyond the lurid pranks that made headlines, the documents show, and included serious understaffing, bullying by management, petty corruption and abusive work conditions.

In fact, the deficiencies became so severe that they threatened the security of the compound, the documents show, and State Department officials withheld payments to ArmorGroup as a way to compel it to comply with the terms of its agreement. On a few occasions, government officials warned the company that if it did not correct the most egregious problems it would lose the five-year, $189 million deal.

Yet both times the contract came up for renewal, in 2008 and 2009, the State Department opted to extend it, officials confirmed.

The troubles with the ArmorGroup contract, and the State Department’s frustrated dealings with the company over two years and through two administrations, illustrate how the government has become dependent on the private security companies that work in war zones, and has struggled to manage companies that themselves are sometimes loosely run and do not always play by the government’s rules.

With a stretched military, the government relies on the security companies themselves to vet, train, and discipline the guards, all at the lowest cost.

“It’s expensive for the State Department to withdraw a contract from one company, rebid the project and award it to a new one,” said Janet Goldstein, a Washington lawyer who represents one of the ArmorGroup whistleblowers. “So businesses know that once they get a contract, State may ding them around a little bit, but it’s not going to fire them.”

The perils of this reliance were most graphically illustrated in Iraq in 2007, when security guards from another contractor, Blackwater, were involved in shootings that left 17 civilians dead on a Baghdad street. But interviews and documents show that the ArmorGroup affair, in its mundane, unsavory details, offers perhaps a more representative look inside the troubled relationship between contractors and the government in war zones.

State Department officials acknowledge they had a litany of complaints about the company, none of which, they insist, compromised the security of the embassy. But they profess to being deeply embarrassed by reports of parties where security guards were photographed naked, fondling and urinating on each other.

“I’ve been doing this for 37 years; I’m proud of what I do,” said Patrick F. Kennedy, the undersecretary of state for management who oversees outside contractors. But, he added, “This is humiliating.”

Mr. Kennedy, however, defended the State Department’s overall handling of the contract. The frequent letters of complaint the government sent to ArmorGroup, he said, were evidence that the department was keeping close tabs on the company. The “greatest majority” of the failures cited in the letters were addressed, he said.

Part of the problem, officials said, was that the guards are housed in a complex six miles from the embassy, Camp Sullivan, with little oversight by State Department officials.

Susan Pitcher, a spokeswoman for Wackenhut Services, the American subsidiary of the Danish company that owns ArmorGroup, referred questions to the State Department, saying only that it was cooperating with the government’s investigation.

On Monday, the independent Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan will hold a hearing to examine the State Department’s oversight of the contract. Christopher Shays, a former congressman and co-chairman of the commission, said there was “a serious failure on the part of the State Department in being unable to compel the contractor to fulfill its commitment.”

The disclosures, which were originally made by a nonprofit organization, Project on Government Oversight, deeply rattled the State Department. At a staff meeting following the release of the group’s report, senior officials said, Mrs. Clinton vented her anger about the lurid pictures. Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired Army general who became President Obama’s ambassador to Afghanistan last May, was livid, an official said, because he had never been briefed about the problems.

Despite their unease with contractors, officials acknowledged the department had no choice but to keep using them.

“In situations where there is a surge of intense security requirements, it is a real challenge,” said Jacob J. Lew, the deputy secretary of state for management and resources. “We cannot reduce the security presence.”

The State Department was not in a buyer’s market when it looked for a company to protect its embassy in Kabul.

It picked ArmorGroup in March 2007, after its previous choice, MVM, proved unable to marshal the necessary personnel or equipment, officials said. Of the eight companies that bid for the contract the second time around, only two were deemed technically capable. ArmorGroup was the cheapest.

The company’s most recent contract extension was granted in June this year, after a Senate hearing in which one of its executives, Samuel Brinkley, a Wackenhut vice president, said in sworn testimony that his company was in full compliance with the terms of its contract, and a State Department official, William H. Moser, a deputy assistant secretary of state, also under oath, said he was satisfied with the company’s performance.

In interviews, ArmorGroup whistleblowers said they felt betrayed by the testimony. By many measures, they said, things were worse, not better. After largely uneventful company barbecues morphed into what have been described as scenes from “The Lord of the Flies,” at least a dozen of the men started a document trail of their own, sending e-mail messages and photographs to the Project on Government Oversight.

According to interviews and those documents, from July 2007 to April 2009, the State Department issued ArmorGroup at least nine warnings, nearly one every other month, about contract violations that ranged from mundane concerns about the company’s ability to keep accurate personnel logs, to more critical concerns about corruption among company managers and the hardships faced by sleep-deprived, underpaid guards — the majority of them Gurkhas from Nepal — who could not understand simple commands in English.

While the Gurkhas were largely the source of the language problems, the lewd hazing rituals were largely the activity of the native English speakers, a mix of Americans, South Africans, New Zealanders and Australians.

In 2008, after ArmorGroup was acquired by the Danish company, G4S, Wackenhut informed the State Department it was taking control of the Kabul contract, and promised to fix any problems.

Government officials agreed to give the new owners a chance. According to their own correspondence, their optimism seemed to dim fairly quickly.

On Aug. 22, 2008, the State Department wrote to ArmorGroup to express concerns that staffing shortages were so severe the company might not be able to provide security after a situation with mass casualties.

On Sept. 21, 2008, the State Department deducted $2.4 million in payments from ArmorGroup, warning that its failure to provide a sufficient number of guards “gravely endangers the performance of guard services.”

In March 2009, the department again advised ArmorGroup that it had “grave concerns” about staffing shortages, noting that inspectors on a recent tour found 18 guardposts left uncovered.

In April, it denied ArmorGroup’s request for a third waiver to the requirement that it teach its foreign guards English.

A month later, without much explanation, ArmorGroup told the State Department that deficiencies relating to language and staffing had been resolved. And a month after that, a senior State Department official told the Senate Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight that “despite contractual deficiencies, the performance by ArmorGroup North America has been and is sound.”

“I sat in the audience that day, and shook my head in disbelief,” said James Gordon, a former ArmorGroup executive who has filed a whistleblower’s lawsuit against the company. He says he was forced out for complaining about the problems. “I knew that conditions at Camp Sullivan were deteriorating, that the contract continued to be understaffed, that the conditions in Kabul were getting more dangerous, and that the U.S. Embassy was facing grave threats.”

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Animal House: The Real Story

Saturday, September 5th, 2009

By Tim Lynch

You have to admit that the current guard force at the U.S. Embassy Kabul know how to get attention. The rash of stories which broke last Wednesday were amusing to say the least. The story broke with a news release from a group called “Project on Government Oversight” (POGO) who had received pictures and written complaints from a group of contractors at the embassy and given the nature of the pictures it went viral.

I was the project manager for the first group of civilian contractors who relieved the Marines (weapons company 2/6) at that embassy in 2005. At the time the contract called for 146 expatriates, 245 third country nationals and around 75 local Afghans. There are things I know which I can not discuss in an open form but let me tell you this; there are serious serious, problems with that contract which have little to do with the behavior highlighted in the tsunami of international coverage.

Managing contracts of this size in Iraq or Afghanistan is an impossible job and there is a very small pool of talent who have the ability and energy to do it well. I came to Kabul from the American Embassy in Baghdad where I first joined the circuit with a British firm. I received a call around Midnight on a Sunday from the company recruiter who I could barely understand and he said in a very loud voice “mate do you have your kit?” I replied in the affirmative and he says “I need a fill in Baghdad mate can you leave in two days?” I again said yes and he yelled “great mate see you in 24 hours.” The next morning I had a ticket to London and I left the following day. It was a weird thing to do but I hated being retired and was a really crappy civilian. I was lucky, the project manager in Baghdad, who would come to back fill me in Kabul two years later was one of the best I have ever seen. He was from Zimbabwe, had extensive combat experience, was of the quiet confident type who paid keen attention to what his expats did both on and off duty.

The main reason why managing these contracts is so difficult is that it is impossible to stay ahead of the stupidity curve your men will generate. There is no way to anticipate it because some of these guys do the most unbelievably stupid things sober; add alcohol and the potential for Darwin Award level stupidity goes up exponentially. In the military I knew my Marines well because we spent so much time together – often in prolonged field exercises. Your average young enlisted Marine has the ability to do stupid things too but they fall into an easily anticipated set of behaviors which savvy leadership can recognize and at times circumvent. Not true with contractors – some of stories I have heard are amazing.

I hated working at the American Embassy in Kabul for a number of reasons. My personal antipathy unquestionably clouds my judgment on the ability, competence, and usefulness of the arrogant snobbish bureaucrats who work there. I showed up on the 7th of March, most of the expats arrived on a charter flight the next day and that ride in was so bad that one of them immediately resigned. We were housed in a hastily built camp which had not been completed – the roof was not even on the barracks. Our Nepalese arrived in April but we had to assume the contract on 17 March. We had been set up to fail because the department in charge of our contract, the Regional Security Officer’s (RSO’s) clearly did not want the Marines to go – I knew some of the Marines and they were feeding me the inside scoop.

Most of the expats who arrived for the contract had worked for the same company during the first Afghan election and they were predominantly from the UK. They were also an older crowed with the talents one expects to find in retired military men so organizing and starting the contract was much easier than the industry norm. Our cookhouse was a nightmare but we had a PA from Scotland who got it sorted out but not before we lost men to hospital to all manner of food borne parasites. The RSO’s would not give us the weapons called for in the contract so we had the send out raiding parties of guys who had worked the election and had weapons stashed or knew where to find them. It was a nightmare and I never got along with the RSO shop but I don’t want to start telling old sea stories or start in on State Department RSO’s. They have plenty of talent in that program and one of them, Tim Sullivan, for whom the current guard camp is named, was one of the best all around operators I have ever met.

The problem with the current guard force is that they are on a shit contract. Ignore the money value published in the papers – that number is for five years executed at full value which is impossible to do . Armor Group North America is losing big money on that job and they are about to lose a lot more. I was asked by a few companies to consult on their bids for it back in 2006 and my answer was always the same – don’t bid because if you win you’ll lose money. There were requirements in the contract that could not be filled. The number of security clearance holding Americans was excessive and unnecessary (it has been modified now.) The skill set required in the contract was out of all proportion to the tasks actually executed by the guards (these too have since been modified) and the training requirements were completely unrealistic given the amount of time the State Department would allow for the guard force to train prior to assuming the contract.

The several hundred page request for proposal (RFP) was full of legalize contract language which was there for the same reason congressional bills are several thousands pages of incomprehensible gibberish – to hide things. In the case of the embassy contract it was penalties for failing to meet certain stipulations. The only companies who could have actually met the requirements at the time were Blackwater and Triple Canopy but they could never submit a bid low enough to win because they have to run the training infrastructure back in the States required by the contract and thus were forced to bid realistic numbers. They were never in the running. All of the contracts being let for security and everything else go to the lowest bidder.

When we started the bridge contract back in 2005 I told the men there that although our billets suck and we look like clowns (we had no uniforms and looked like a motorcycle gang on post with civvie clothing and old AK 47’s with chest rigs. I thought it looked kind of cool but it wasn’t good for morale) that experience tells us that we will be on the job for years, not the six months of the contract and that the pay is good, risk is low, and thus by definition life is good. I was proved correct – the bridge contract lasted two years before a company successfully took over. The first company to win the contract was MVM and their genius plan was to bring in South African passport holding Vamba tribal fighters from Namibia to work as the senior guards and “english speaking ” junior guards from Peru. The South African plan met the terms of the contract but turned out to be a disaster. When the Peruvians arrived not one of them could speak a word of English. I was there for that too and am thus unable to go into the details.

When Armor Group won they were heading down the same path as MVM but at the last minute the CEO came in, immediately fired his management team and entered into negotiations with the existing project manager for him and his crew to come aboard. I am hesitant to go into detail due to an acute congenital fear of lawyers. Runs in my family according to my Father, but suffice it say the pay for new joins was low and did not favor Americans who cannot be paid on leave by an American company without becoming an employee with the full benefit and tax load. That lasted a little less than a year until the PM got bored and left which caused the immediate exodus of all the old guards who Armor group wanted to be rid of so they could bring in guys at a much reduced daily rate. You get what you pay for in this industry and Armor Group was not paying much.

The pay thing is a problem which can worked through with good on the ground leadership and incentives for people who are on their second, third or fourth year of the contract; the real problem is with the living conditions and job requirements of the guard force. The average living space per man in Camp Sullivan is less than the square footage required for inmates in federal penitentiaries. I put that in writing in a memo to the RSO when the camp was being built which may help explain the stained relationship I had with him. The recreation facilities are inadequate and the gym full of third rate Turkish equipment. There is no space on the camp for the men to do anything outside of their crammed barracks and they have little ability to get off camp. When you are designing camps to house hundreds of guards for years at a time you have to pay attention to their morale recreation and welfare needs which is something the military excels at. If you do not think through what they are going to do off duty as thoroughly as their on duty tasks than you are set up to fail.

Now that the furor of last week has died down it appears that our Secretary of State has the situation in hand. Surprisingly enough she found the behavior completely inappropriate and a threat to good order and discipline. I don’t understand that – what business is it of hers what consenting adults do? Is that not the lesson of the Lewinsky affair? Maybe it was because the guards were having these stupid parties on a facility rented by the State Department which drew her condemnation – but the oval office is even more important a government place than Camp Sullivan isn’t it? Or maybe she was upset because management was encouraging this nonsense which means there is a disparity in power between the individuals involved which makes even their consent suspect….you know like the disparity of power between the President of the United States and an intern? No wait that can’t be it…anyway the boss has taken a stand against serial sexual predators (first time for everything) and fired the whole crew.

But that contract will still be have a ton of problems and the men working there will continue to be even more miserable than the FOB bound military who at least have good gyms, pizza hut, lots of girls on their bases, green beans coffee houses etc..

There is only way to fix the Embassy contract and that is to cut the number of guards in half, make them all Americans and pull them into the embassy where they can work and live along side the other Americans. The security guards are not now and never have been able to use the gyms or bars or tennis courts or swimming pool which are all reserved for embassy staff. That should change. The security guard contract should also be combined with the Ambassadors PSD contract (currently Blackwater and before them DynCorp) so that guards joining the contract can work their way up onto the Ambassador’s detail – that way when a new guy joins that team he has a clue about Afghanistan. Knowing how to “evasive drive” or shoot is useless here – knowing the people, how they drive and what is normal behavior is critical and you can’t learn that in security “operator” school. What are the chances that the State Department is aware enough to recognize the problems they created on this contract and then really fix them? Absolutely zero. Like I said I hated working that contract because the people you are serving are just plain rude, nasty, arrogant and worse yet completely clueless about what is happening outside the walls of their plush digs.

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Tim Lynch is a former U.S. Marine Corps Infantry Officer.  He’s also a seasoned private security contractor and runs his own blog at Free Range International which chronicles his on-the-ground perspective of life in Afghanistan.

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Armor Group Fires U.S. Embassy Guards in Kabul

Saturday, September 5th, 2009

Scandal Involving Civilian Security Detail Highlights U.S. Government’s Often-Tense Relationships With Contractors

By AUGUST COLE

The State Department said Friday that several managers and eight guards at a security firm hired to protect the U.S. embassy in Kabul had been removed after lurid party photos and new alleged oversight lapses emerged this week.

Two other guards for the firm, ArmorGroup North America, a unit of Wackenhut Services Inc., also have resigned, the State Department said in a statement Friday. It wasn’t clear how many managers were being replaced. The 10 guards are leaving Afghanistan.

The dismissals are the latest embarrassment in the U.S.’s struggle to manage its security contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. The timing is particularly sensitive, coming just as the U.S. ramps up the Afghan military campaign, an effort that will require adding tens of thousands of military support and security contractors. Almost 74,000 contractors are already working for the Defense Department alone in Afghanistan, a record amount, and thousands more work for the State Department.

A watchdog group released photos earlier this week showing drunken behavior and hazing among ArmorGroup guards in Kabul.

Earlier this week, the Project on Government Oversight, an independent watchdog group, released documents, photos and videos detailing drunken behavior and hazing among unclothed ArmorGroup guards at their base in Kabul. The watchdog group said Friday that it was pleased the State Department was taking action. But the group also wanted “to hear that the supervisors who were responsible for this debacle are being held fully accountable and not simply allowed to resign and go to another contractor,” according to a statement.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday that if the allegations were true, “those activities are not just offensive to Afghans and Muslims; they’re offensive to us, and inexcusable.”

ArmorGroup referred questions to the State Department, citing the terms of its contract. The State Department said Friday investigators from the inspector general’s office have been dispatched to Kabul, along with other officials looking into the matter.

A Senate investigation this summer found lapses ranging from insufficient English skills among guards to poor training that left the U.S. embassy in Kabul vulnerable to a possible attack. State Department officials disputed that assessment in testimony before Congress.

ArmorGroup North America took over the contract to guard the Kabul embassy in 2007.

David Berteau, director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, said many of the problems the government has with contractors stem from government contracts that are poorly written and not managed well.

“The fix is way bigger than just replacing one group of people with another,” he said.

The government is heavily dependent on the services these companies provide — which range from doing laundry to protecting diplomats — and this looks to continue to be the case in Afghanistan.

A September 2007 shooting in Baghdad involving a State Department security detail of Blackwater Worldwide guards left 17 Iraqi civilians dead and prompted the U.S. to pledge to drop the contractor.

Earlier this year, the State Department hired DynCorp International Inc. to take over part of Blackwater’s contract in Iraq to fly helicopters for department personnel.

While the department has moved away from using Blackwater security guards who for years protected convoys of diplomats, this related contract, worth hundreds of millions of dollars a year, remains with the company’s air wing, Presidential Airways.

The U.S. continues to use Presidential Airways because DynCorp International has been unable to get its specially modified aircraft properly certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, according to people familiar with the situation.

A DynCorp spokesman declined to comment.

A spokeswoman for Blackwater’s parent company, Xe Services LLC did not return a call seeking comment.

—Yochi J. Dreazen contributed to this article.

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